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To name is to possess, to make sure of one's hold over a person.'
The power and force of a name are often underestimated in today's so-
ciety. For centuries, social and political struggles have often been reflected
in struggles over names and the naming process. Names have often been
used as a means of insuring allegiance and fealty, as when King John
required conquered Welsh insurgents to adopt names identifying them as
King John's subjects. 2 In the early 1900's, the resentment against immi-
grants resulted in strong pleas to prevent them from adopting more com-
mon names which disguised their immigrant ancestry. 3 Today, the issue
of a married woman's legal name reflects a continuing struggle over the
status of married women in society and in the family structure. As married
1. Sarano, Il ou Toi?, Pa.9SENCES (No. 82, 1st term 1973), quoted in P. TOURNIER, THE
NAMnGo OF PERSONS 34 (1975).
2. Lanahan, What's in a Name?: Family Surnames and Social Upheaval in Medieval
England, 65 THE SOCIAL STUDIES 218, 221 (1974) [hereinafter cited as LANAHAN].
3. See note 165 infra and accompanying text.
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women who had adopted their husbands' surnames petition courts to rein-
state their pre-marriage names, courts have wrestled with the issues of
reinstatement.
In 1972, when the Supreme Court affirmed without opinion a lower
court's rejection of constitutional challenges to a requirement that married
women adopt their husbands' surname,' the challenge drew increasing
attention from legal periodicals across the country.5 Most of the articles
published concerned the constitutional issues involved. Although there
have been decisions discussing the merits of constitutional challenges,
most courts since 1972 have found it unnecessary to reach constitutional
issues. Instead, these recent decisions have re-examined the common law
history of surnames. Since 1973, the highest courts in five states - Vir-
ginia,6 Maine,7 Tennessee,' Wisconsin' and Indiana'" - have rendered sig-
nificant decisions which have reshaped this area of law.
This comment explores the impact of these recent developments. After
examining the impact that a name may have, it focuses upon the English
common law history of surnames, the marital surname requirement and
the legal issues related to the reinstatement of a married woman's pre-
marriage surname.
I. THE IMPACT OF A NAME
The importance of a name should not be underestimated. In many cul-
tures the true name of a person is kept a secret, because to know it and to
use it might enable another to gain power over him." Thus a person often
4. Forbush v. Wallace, 341 F. Supp. 217 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd without opinion, 405 U.S.
970 (1972).
5. See generally Bysiewicz, Married Women's Surnames, 5 CONN. L. REV. 598 (1973);
Carlsson, Surnames of Married Women and Legitimate Children, 17 N.Y.L. FORUM 552
(1971); Hughes, And Then There Were Two, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 223 (1971); Karst, "A Discrimi-
nation So Trivial": A Note on Law and the Symbolism of Women's Dependency, 35 OHIO
ST. L.J. 546 (1974); Lamber, A Married Woman's Surname: Is Custom Law? 1973 WASH.
U.L.Q. 779; Comment, Married Woman's Right to Her Maiden Name: The Possibilities for
Change, 23 BUFFALO L. REV. 243 (1973); Comment, Pre-Marriage Name Change, Resumption
and Registration Statutes, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1508 (1974); Comment, The Right of a Married
Woman to Use Her Birth-Given Surname for Voter Registration, 32 MD. L. REV. 409 (1973);
Comment, A Woman's Right to Her Name, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 665 (1973). See also Annot.,
67 A.L.R.3d 1266 (1976); Daum, The Right of Named Women to Assert Their Own Surnames,
8 J.L. REFORM 63 (1974).
6. In re Strikwerda, 216 Va. 470, 220 S.E.2d 245 (1975).
7. In re Reben, 342 A.2d 688 (Me. 1975).
8. Dunn v. Palermo, 522 S.W.2d 679 (Tenn. 1975).
9. Kruzel v. Podell, 67 Wis. 2d 138, 226 N.W.2d 458 (1975).
10. Petition of Hauptly, 312 N.E.2d 857 (Ind. 1974).
11. L.G. PINE, THE STORY OF SURNAMES 10-11 (1966) [hereinafter cited as PINE].
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goes through life with a nickname or secondary name known by most
acquaintances, while his real name is known by only a select few. 12 Primi-
tive cultures often assume that a person is concentrated in his or her
name. 3 The importance of a name and the significance of changing it has
been the subject of recent theological and philosophical discussion. 4 In
addition, there are several scientific studies indicating that names and
forms of address lead to expectations which may shape a person's percep-
tions of the name bearer. 5 An interesting study of expectations of college
and high school students suggests that women instructors called by tradi-
tional titles (either "Miss" or "Mrs.") are at a significant disadvantage
compared to teachers identified as "Ms."' 6 The preconceptions of others
may shape a person's personality and identity.
12. Id.
13. E. JACOB, THEOLOGY OF THE OLD TESTAMENT 43 (1958). Indeed, the name itself was often
viewed as having an independent power "which exercises constraint upon the one who bears
it." Id. Thus, a person tends to conform to the characteristics exemplified by his or her name.
For example, a person named "Doolittle" might become a lazy person because of the name.
14. See, e.g., P. ToURNIER, THE NAMING OF PERSONS (1975), in which this prominent theolo-
gian notes that even though many are dissatisfied with their names, few persons adopt
different ones.
What separates and distinguishes me from other people is the fact that I am called by
my name; but what unites me with them is the very fact that they call me.
Id. at5.
It seems, therefore, as if the usual name received from one's parents has a sacred
character. It has some sort of magic power, so that one may fear or even hate it, but
not dare to do anything about it. . . .And so to change one's name is to break one's
continuity as a person, to cut oneself offfrom the whole of one's past, which has defined
one's person up to that point. . . . The new name asserts that a new life is beginning.
Id. at 19.
Toumier calls upon the Biblical examples of Abram becoming Abraham, Jacob taking the
name of Israel and Saul becoming Paul. Those converting to the Islamic faith often assume
new names which reflect their new identity. The changing of one's name has traditionally
signalled a change in identity.
15. See Buchanan & Bruning, Connotative Meanings of First Names and Nicknames on
Three Dimensions, 85 J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 143-44 (1971); McDavid & Harari, Stereotyping of
Names and Popularity in Grade-School Children, 37 CHILD DEVELOPMENT 453-59 (1966) (social
attractiveness may be related to more frequently encountered names than infrequent ones).
16. Heilman, Miss, Mrs., Ms., or None of the Above, 30 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 516-19 (1975).
Undergraduates at Yale University and high school seniors in New York City were given
identical course descriptions after which the instructor was identified as either "Mrs.,"
"Ms.," "Miss," "Mr. J.R. Erwin" or simply "J.R. Erwin." Courses taught by "Ms." instruc-
tors were comparably rated with "Mr." and "No Title" instructors. Students given identical
nontechnical course descriptions expected the courses taught by "Miss" or "Mrs." instructors
to be less popular and to offer less intellectual challenge than those taught by "Mr.," "Ms."
or "No Title" instructors.
17. Schoenberg & Murphy, The Relationship Between the Uniqueness of a Given Name
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The very fact that a married woman's right to use her pre-marriage name
has evoked such strong reaction from both proponents and opponents indi-
cates the importance of a person's name. Requiring the wife to adopt the
husband's name implicitly symbolizes a certain understanding of the
wife's relationship to the husband and to the outside world.' 8 Requiring
husband and wife to have a common name, as others have suggested,'" is
also indicative of a preconceived concept of the marriage bond. 0 Those who
would allow a woman the freedom of retaining her pre-marriage name
and Personality, 93 J. Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 147-48 (1974) (males with common given names
indicated more guilt, inferiority and timidity than those with uncommon names; no statisti-
cally significant differences among females with common and uncommon given names).
Several social scientists hypothesize, but have not established, a relationship between sur-
name length and mate selection by women. See Cabe, Name Length as a Factor in Mate
Selection: Age Controlled, 22 PSYCH. Rprs. 794 (1968); Finch & Mahoney, Name Length as a
Factor in Mate Selection: An Age Controlled Replication, 37 PsYCH. RPTs. 642 (1975).
18. This view is reflected in the judicial doctrine of coverture which decreed that a married
woman had no legal identity apart from her husband. Thus the husband and wife were one,
and the husband was considered "the one." United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 361 (1966)
(Black, J., dissenting). The married woman could not sue or be sued, control property or make
a contract.
These are the chief legal effects of marriage during the coverture; upon which we may
observe, that even the disabilities, which the wife lies under, are for the most part
intended for her protection and relief. So great a favorite is the female sex of the laws
of England ...
1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 442 (8th ed. 1778).
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law; that is, the very being or
legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorpo-
rated and consolidated into that of the husband ...
Id. at 445.
19. See, e.g., the dissent in In re Reben, 342 A.2d 688, 701-02 (Me. 1975), in which Chief
Justice Dufresne argues:
She [the wife] is on the same footing as her prospective husband in that she may
insist, as a premarital condition, that the family surname for her intended husband
and herself be that of her choice. The husband has no greater right to change the family
surname than she has, since her disability is equally his. . . . That there should be a
single surname available to identify the spouses and children of a marriage is inherent
in the very concept of marriage itself. . . . From that premise it follows that, absent
specific authority to do so by legislative declaration, a married woman may not, during
the existence of the marriage contract, adopt any other surname as her legal name,
except with the concurrence of her husband in a judicial proceeding. . . in which both
seek a change of the family surname. . ..
20. The focus of those adopting this position is toward the bond of the marriage commit-
ment itself rather than toward the wife's relationship to the husband. Many couples, realizing
the significance that a common name-symbol can have in affirming the bond of marriage,
have chosen to adopt common hyphenated names rather than retain antenuptial surnames.
The mutuality within the commitment is expressed by having both partners relinquish former
surnames.
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assert that recognition of this freedom symbolizes the right of a wife to be
a fully equal partner in marriage. These positions share a common recogni-
tion that a name functions as a powerful symbol of identity. The issue
raised in cases where a married woman is seeking to use a maiden name is
not whether a married woman is a "kind of odd ball."'" Rather, the issue
is whether society has such a significant interest in a particular name-
symbol of marriage that a married woman must bear a name which she
feels does not reflect her true identity.
II. THE HISTORY OF SURNAMES
Surnames developed in England over a long period of time. Few, if any,
surnames existed in England before the Norman Conquest of 1066. The
Norman conquerors introduced surnames to England in addition to other
elements of the Norman culture, according to the accepted theory." Only
a few of the new Christian names introduced by the Normans were
popular, consequently, this scarcity of Christian names led to the increas-
ing use of surnames in order to distinguish persons bearing the same
name? 3 By the early part of the fourteenth century, surnames had become
common." Many writers assert that increased commerce, communication
21. Brief for Appellee (State of Indiana) at 10, Petition of Hauptly, 312 N.E.2d 857, 861
(Ind. 1974). Among the characterizations in the state's brief, quoted by the court at 861, were
the following:
Perhaps she is claiming the woman's privilege in that in an argument she does not have
to use reasoning.
It can be reasonably inferred that she believes the fact that she is the breadwinner of
the family should be publicized so that all will know her husband has been emascu-
lated and that she is the head of the family.
.. .indicating that perhaps Mrs. Hauptly's need was not for a change of name but
for a competent psychiatrist.
Namely a sick and confused woman, unhappy and unsatisfied with her marriage,
unable to determine what she wants to do with her life.
312 N.E.2d at 861.
The reversal of the lower court decision may have reflected the court's disappointment with
the character of the state's brief. Id.
22. LANAHAN, supra note 2, at 218.
23. P. REANEY, THE ORIGINS OF ENGLISH SURNAMES 314 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
REANEY]; Arnold, Personal Names, 15 YALE L.J. 227 (1905) [hereinafter cited as ARNOLD].
Arnold estimates that there were no more than two hundred Christian names during the early
portion of the fourteenth century. Reaney asserts that the paucity of Christian names has
been overemphasized as a factor leading to general use of surnames.
24. ARNOLD, supra note 23, at 227.
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and urbanization were responsible for the increased usage of surnames.
Reaney suggests that the primary impetus for the emergence of surnames
was the need of various officials and lords to know the exact identification
of each person.26 The king had to know exactly what service each knight
owed. Payments to and by the exchequer required that debtors and credi-
tors be particularized. The parties to land transfers, those involved in
criminal proceedings and those assessed in the Subsidy Rolls had to be
described with precision. Surnames first became numerous and hereditary
among those persons in the upper classes, persons with whom officials were
chiefly concerned."
Surnames were developed from distinctive physical characteristics,"
personalities," occupations" and locations.' Many names resulted from a
person's relationship to either his father,32 mother13 or other relative. 4
25. Id. Lanahan hypothesizes that serfs fleeing to the city in order to escape the lord of
the manor heightened the pace of urbanization. The surname, according to Lanahan, resulted
from the "gathering of strangers" who needed an easy means of identifying one another.
LANAHAN, supra note 2, at 221-22.
26. REANEY, supra note 23, at 314. Often, however, officials required persons to adopt
certain surnames for political purposes. Thus in 1465 King Edward, by a statute, required
every Irishman living within a certain distance of Dublin to give up his Gaelic name by
translating it into an English patronymic, nickname or trade name; in 1211 King John
required conquered Welsh insurgents to adopt a name identifying themselves as King John's
subjects. LANAHAN, supra note 2, at 221.
27. REANEY, supra note 23, at 315.
28. Examples include Blount (blond), Reid or Russell (red), Brown or Dunn (dark), Blake
(black), Grey and White.
29. Examples include Doolittle (lazy), Curtis (courteous), Keen or Sharpe (shrewd), Quick
and Savage. Many names no longer common are even more indicative of personalities. See
C.W. BARDSLEY, ENGLISH SURNAMES (7th ed. 1901) [hereinafter cited as BARDSLEY]. "William
Ryghtwys" was Vicar of Foulden in 1497. Id. at 463 "Joan Make-peace," sister of Henry In,
was so named because her betrothal to the Scottish monarch brought peace. Id. "Ralph Full-
of-Love" was Rector of West Lynn in 1462. Id. at 474. "Alicia Blissewenche," "Henry Parra-
more," "Henry le Liere" and "William Gidyheved" (Gidyhead) are a few of the other names
mentioned by Bardsley. Id. at 472-80.
30. Examples include Miller, Faulkner (falconer), Carpenter, Hooper (barrel-maker),
Potter, Parson, Thatcher and Slater (roofing). Several surnames are feminizations of male
occupational surnames. Webster represents a female weaver. Brewster represents a female
brewer. Baxter represents a female baker. See LANAHAN, supra note 2, at 220.
31. Many names, which were at first simply "of" a certain place, became formal surnames.
Thus "John of Salisbury" became "John Salisbury" and "Matthew of Paris" became "Mat-
thew Paris." The surname of Thomas Aquinas was taken from the place of his birth,
Aquinum, in order to distinguish him from other persons named "Thomas." PINE, supra note
11, at 42.
32. BARDSLEY, supra note 29, at 9; PINE, supra note 11, at 58.
33. REANEY, supra note 23, at 76; BARDsLEY, supra note 29, at 80.
34. REANEY, supra note 23, at 80.
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Although Christian names were regarded by the law as of critical
significance because of the sanction of baptism, a person could possess
several surnames simultaneously.35 Thus Sir Edward Coke noted: "And
regularly it is requisite . . . that speciall heed bee taken to the name of
baptism for that a man cannot have two names of baptism as he may have
divers surnames."36 The lack of significance of the surname in England is
underscored by the fact that the British royal family did not officially have
a surname until 1917.11 In 1960, Queen Elizabeth varied the surnames of
some future descendants so that many future royal surnames will be hy-
phenated. 8 Such hyphenation of names came to England in the eighteenth
century when the joining of property became critical among the wealthy. 9
Scholars have failed to explain satisfactorily why surnames became he-
reditary after achieving common acceptance in the fourteenth century.
The desire to preserve a family name and the close association of surnames
with land seem to be critical factors, however. Thus sons adopted the
surnames of mothers through whom they inherited property." In one in-
stance a wife, who had adopted the husband's surname at marriage, reas-
sumed her father's name after inheriting property from him; her husband
also changed to her father's name.4 Often the inheritance of property was
conditioned upon the retention of the family name associated with that
property.2
35. ARNOLD, supra note 23, at 228.
36. Coke Litt § 3(a). "The law is not so precise in the case of surnames, but for the
Christian name, this ought always be perfect." Button v. Wrightman, Poph. 56 (1682), cited
in ARNOLD, supra note 23, at 228. The concern for Christian names has abated significantly.
Presidents Grant and Cleveland were elected under different Christian names than those
given at baptism. ARNOLD, supra note 23, at 229.
37. PINE, supra note 11, at 17. The common surname of Windsor was adopted because
many members of the royal family had German names and titles which proved embarrassing
during World War I.
38. PINE, supra note 11, at 19.
39. Id.
40. Examples include Reginald Damemalde (son of Dame Maud), Walter Damealis and
Adam Damemagot. REANEY, supra note 23, at 84.
41. [W]hen heiresses marry, they so often keep their maiden names, while their hus-
bands change theirs to their wives' names .... In one entry, a woman takes her
husband's name but when her father dies and she inherits his property, they both
change to the father's name. Hugh atte Clawe of Thorpe appears quite often as Hugh
le Kach or Keach, because of his marriage to Alice le Keach; and when John atte Hethe
of Cobham marries Lucy atte Grene, the remark is added 'He is now called atte Grene.'
E. Toms, COURT BOOK OF CHERTSEY ABBEY 38-39 (1937), quoted in REANEY, supra note 23, at
85.
42. PINE, supra note 11, at 19. The "family felt they ought to keep the name on the land."
REANEY, supra note 23, at 85. Often this practice resulted in multiple hyphenated names such
as Cave-Brown-Cave or Plunkett-Ernle-Erle-Drax. PINE, supra note 11, at 22-23.
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Anyone at common law could change a surname at will and without legal
proceedings, unless motivated by fraudulent purposes. 3 A new name was
acquired by general usage in the community.4 When a woman married she
generally adopted the name of the husband by usage but she was not
required to do so. Thus the Earl of Halsbury summarizes the long-standing
rule in England: "When a woman on her marriage assumes, as she usually
does in England, the surname of her husband in substitution for her fa-
ther's name, it may be said that she acquires a new name by repute. The
change of name is in fact, rather than in law, a consequence of marriage. 45
There were significant instances in which the wife and the husband held
different surnames.46 It was even more common for the husband to adopt
the wife's surname. 7
In Cowley v. Cowley, Lord Cowley sued to prevent his divorced wife from
bearing his name and arms. Although the House of Lords enjoined her from
using the title "Countess," it refused to require that she desist from using
"Cowley" as a surname because a person may assume any name so long
as not for fraudulent purposes.
Because a wife was not legally required to adopt the surname of the
husband, the House of Lords found itself powerless to compel her to adopt
her second husband's surname despite the protests of her previous hus-
band." The Marriage Act, 26 Geo. II 33, requiring that marriage banns 9
43. Many law review articles written before the current debate over a married woman's
name either assume this fact to be too obvious to require citation of authority or contained
long lists of old cases upholding this position. See Dwight, Proper Names, 20 YALE L.J. 387,
(1911) ("There is not the slightest doubt that the decision [upholding the right to change a
surname without legal proceedings] was correct upon the law as it stands to-day. By the
common law of England a man was entitled to adopt a new name for himself as one changes
a coat."); Gordon, Change of Patronymic, 56 CANADA L.J. 1, 2 (1920) (lengthy list of old
English cases so holding is given); Savage, Proper Designation of Married Women in Legal
Proceedings, 4 VA. L. REG. 720 (n.s. 1919) ("The right of a person to change his name at
common law is too well recognized to need the citation of authority."); Note, The Right to
Change One's Name, 5 J. FAMILY L. 220, 221 (1965). See also Dunn v. Palermo, 522 S.W.2d
679, 682 (Tenn. 1975).
44. An "alias" in our society often connotes criminal activity. Using the term in England
became an innocent means of signalling the adoption of a new name. Thus one letter to a
relative concludes "Your loving kinsman, Oliver Williams alias Cromwell." Williams had
adopted the name Cromwell at the King's insistence. PINE, supra note 11, at 19.
45. 19 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 829 (3d ed. 1957). Accord, C. EWEN, A HISTORY OF THE
BRInISH ISLES 391 (1931); M. TURNER-SAMUELS, THE LAW OF MARRIED WOMEN 345 (1957).
46. PINE, supra note 11, at 23. Lady Hatton, the second wife of Sir Edward Coke, Lord
Chief Justice of England, did not adopt the surname of her husband. M. TURNER-SAMIELS,
THE LAW OF MARRIED WOMEN 345 (1957).
47. PINE, supra note 11, at 23. Compare note 40 supra and accompanying text.
48. Cowley v. Cowley, [1901] A.C. 450, 460. See note 43 supra.
49. Marriage banns are the public "notice or proclamation of a matrimonial contract, and
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be made in the "true" names of the parties, often led to cases in which the
"true" name of a woman was at issue. In 1823, the Kings Bench faced the
question of the "true" name of a widowed woman who had resumed her
pre-marriage name by repute and whose marriage banns had been pub-
lished under her pre-marriage name." The Kings Bench stated:
It has been asserted in argument, that a married woman cannot legally bear
any other name than that which she has acquired in wedlock, but the fact is
not so; a married woman may legally bear a different name from her husband
and very many living instances might be quoted in proof of the fact.'
The common law heritage which has established roots for so much of
American law never required a woman to adopt her husband's surname.
While most married women did so, the numerous occasions in which this
custom was not followed are significant. The guiding common law princi-
ple regarding surnames was that an individual has great freedom in deter-
mining his or her name.
III. ELEVATING CUSTOM INTO LAW?
A. EARLIER TRENDS: "IMMEMORIAL CUSTOM" AND LAW
Ironically, the marital surname custom, never legally required in Eng-
land, was viewed initially as a legal requirement in the United States by
several courts which confronted the question indirectly. In Chapman v.
Phoenix National Bank,5" the New York Court of Appeals decided that
publication in a woman's pre-marriage name was ineffective notice to a
married woman. Chapman sought to recover dividends which the bank
claimed had been confiscated in a prior judgment in a federal district
court. The Court of Appeals decided that, since the previous suit had been
brought in her pre-marriage name, Chapman did not receive adequate
notice of the proceedings.53 In dictum,54 the court noted:
the intended celebration of the marriage of the parties in pursuance of such contract."
BLAcK's LAW DicTIONARY 187 (4th rev. ed. 1968).
50. The King v. The Inhabitants of St. Faith's Newton, (K.B. 1823) Dowling and Ryland
Reports 348.
51. Id. at 352. Cf. Chipase v. Chipase [1939] 3 All. E.R. 895, [1939] P.391; Sullivan v.
Sullivan, 161 Eng. Rep. 728, at 733 (Con. 1818) (publication in true name is required unless
overriden by usage of another name).
52. 85 N.Y. 437 (1881).
53. The court also relied upon the fact that Chapman could not have received notice of
the stock seizure during the Civil War because she was "within the Confederate lines" and"could not have crossed the lines to respond thereto." Id. at 448.
54. This dictum was described by one court as a "triumph for this lady but a travesty and
a tragedy for her sex." Dunn v. Palermo, 522 S.W.2d 679, 684 (Tenn. 1975).
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For several centuries, by the common law among all English-speaking people,
a woman upon her marriage, takes her husband's surname. That becomes her
legal name, and she ceases to be known by her maiden name. By that name
she must sue and be sued, make and take grants, and execute all legal
documents. Her maiden name is absolutely lost, and she ceases to be known
thereby. 5
Many courts later cited the Chapman statement as authority for the
position that a married woman was required by law to forfeit her pre-
marriage name. A majority of these cases involved the issue of whether a
legal document or action is invalid if the woman is identified by her pre-
marriage name. 6
In many cases, the requirement that a married woman must use her
husband's surname has been directly attacked. The United States
Comptroller-General once ruled that a married woman, who was employed
by the government and who had consistently used her pre-marriage name,
had to use her husband's surname on the payroll in order to draw pay.57
In People ex rel. Rago v. Lipsky,5" the court held that a married woman
was required to register and vote under her husband's surname. As a law-
yer, she had established a professional reputation under her pre-marriage
name and was a member of the bar in her pre-marriage name. The court
noted Chapman for its holding that
it is well settled by common law principles and immemorial custom that a
woman upon marriage abandons her maiden name and takes the husband's
surname.9
A federal district court in In re Kayloff° held that a professional musician
seeking naturalization could not receive her naturalization certificate in
55. Chapman v. Phoenix Nat'l Bank, 85 N.Y. 437, 450 (1881).
56. See, e.g., Bacon v. Boston Elev. Ry. Co., 256 Mass. 30, 152 N.E.35 (1926) (suit barred
because automobile registered in maiden name is not legally registered); Freeman v. Hawk-
ins, 77 Tex. 498, 14 S.W. 364 (1890) (court has no jurisdiction if suit is in wife's maiden name).
Many courts facing this issue held that use of the maiden name did not void an otherwise
valid transaction. See, e.g., Roberts v. Grayson, 233 Ala. 658, 173 So. 33 (1937); Emery v.
Kipp, 154 Cal. 83, 97 P. 17 (1908); Jones v. Kohler, 137 Ind. 528, 37 N.E. 399 (1894); Doyle
v. Hays Land & Inv. Co., 80 Kan. 209, 102 P. 496 (1909); Lane v. Duchac, 73 Wis. 646, 41
N.W. 962 (1889) (married women may convey property in maiden name).
57. This decision was criticized in 73 U. PA. L. REv. 110 (1924). This article is perhaps the
earliest of many articles to question the elevation of surname custom into law.
58. 327 Ill. App. 63, 63 N.E.2d 642 (Ct. App. 1945).
59. Id. at 67, 63 N.E.2d at 644. The effect of the Rago decision has been greatly diminished
by the effect of a formal opinion issued by the Attorney General of Illinois on February 13,
1974, in which he states that the position taken in Rago should not be followed. See Dunn v.
Palermo, 522 S.W.2d 679, 684-85 (Tenn. 1975).
60. 9 F. Supp. 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1934).
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her pre-marriage name. The court seemed skeptical that any harm or loss
would result from denying her request and decided to follow the language
of Chapman.
In 1972, the United States Supreme Court affirmed summarily the deci-
sion of a three-judge federal district court in Forbush v. Wallace.' Peti-
tioner Forbush challenged the refusal of the Alabama Department of Pub-
lic Safety to issue a driver's license in her pre-marriage name. The federal
district court interpreted earlier decisions by Alabama courts as holding
that the wife is required to adopt the husband's surname."2
Initially only a few courts refused to elevate English custom into Ameri-
can law. In Ohio, two courts held that a woman took her husband's sur-
name as a matter of custom and not by requirement of law. In State ex
rel. Bucher v. Brower,63 the court rejected the contention of the Board of
Elections of Montgomery County that a married woman must re-register
with the Board because her name had been changed by marriage. The
court placed great emphasis upon the ease with which a person could
change a name at common law and upon the antenuptial contract executed
between this couple which provided that the wife would retain her pre-
marriage name." The Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County expressly
adopted the decision of the Bucher court in State ex rel. Krupa v. Greer.65
In Krupa, the court held that because Krupansky had used her pre-
marriage name consistently after marriage and pursuant to an antenuptial
contract with her husband, she could not be forced to adopt her husband's
surname. In both Bucher and Krupa, the courts emphasized the consent
61. 341 F. Supp. 217 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd without opinion, 405 U.S. 970 (1972).
62. The court referred to Roberts v. Grayson, 233 Ala. 658, 173 So. 38 (1937), and Bentley
v. State, 37 Ala. App. 463, 465, 70 So. 2d 430, 432 (Ct. App. 1954). The Roberts court had
held that a "married woman's name consists, in law, of her own Christian name and her
husband's surname." 233 Ala. at 660, 173 So. at 39. The thrust of the court's holding was
that the pre-marriage name used in a claim against an estate was sufficient to give notice
stimulating inquiry. Roberts "does not raise the question or discuss or decide the issue of
whether a married woman automatically, and as a matter of law, assumes the surname of
her husband." Dunn v. Palermo, 522 S.W.2d 679, 684 (Tenn. 1975). The Bentley decision,
which concerns the prosecution of a wife for removing furniture, merely reports that the
husband "furnishes the name" for a family. There is no discussion of whether a wife is
required to adopt a husband's surname.
63. 7 Ohio Supp. 51, 21 Ohio Op. 208 (Montgomery County C.P. 1941).
64. Marriage being a civil contract in the state of Ohio, what was to prevent Ger-
trude A. Bucher and Charles L. Marshall . . . from entering into a separate and
distinct contract that Gertrude A. Bucher should retain the surname of Bucher at the
time and after the consummation of the marriage contract .... The court fails to see
where it would be contrary to public morals or in any manner contrary to public policy.
21 Ohio Op. at 214.
65. 114 Ohio App. 497, 117 N.E.2d 616 (Ct. App. 1961).
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of the husband to the retention of the pre-marriage name, as expressed
through antenuptial contracts.
The Bucher and Krupa decisions were for a considerable time the only
American common law decisions" indicating that married women were not
required to adopt their husbands' surnames. As time has passed and schol-
ars have more carefully researched the custom surrounding marital sur-
names in England, it has become increasingly clear that the Bucher and
Krupa decisions were more reflective of the important common law princi-
ples than the majority view.
B. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: CUSTOM ONLY
Since 1972, the number of cases dealing with the question of whether a
woman is required to adopt her husband's surname has increased dramati-
cally. There has been a significant shift of opinion regarding the marital
surname custom as well. Today a clear majority of courts holds that Eng-
lish surname custom does not create American law. Courts are holding
that American married women are as free as their common law English
counterparts to deviate from custom if they so wish. Only a dwindling
number of courts is indicating that a woman is required by law to adopt
her husband's surname.
In Stuart v. Board of Maryland Supervisors of Elections,6 the Maryland
Court of Appeals held that a woman may retain her pre-marriage name
by evidencing "a clear intent to consistently and nonfraudulently use her
birth given name subsequent to her marriage."68 The Board of Supervisors
of Elections for Howard County had cancelled Stuart's voter registration
because she had refused to re-register under her husband's surname after
marriage. The lower court held that since a woman's name changed by
force of law upon her marriage, Stuart's registration should be cancelled
66. The civil law rule seems to be that a married woman retains her pre-marriage name at
law and uses her husband's surname solely as a matter of custom. See Succession of Kneipp,
172 La. 411, 134 So. 376 (1931). A later Louisiana case, Wilty v. Jefferson Parish Democratic
Executive Comm., 245 La. 145, 157 So. 2d 718 (1963), has often been interpreted as having
adopted the rule that a married woman adopts the husband's surname at marriage. Com-
ment, A Woman's Right to Her Name, 21 U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 665, 667 n.14 (1973). The Wilty
case resulted in five opinions and it is not clear that a majority deviated from the Kneipp
decision. The concern of the court appears to have been the fairness of elections rather than
the correctness of a married woman's name. See Dunn v. Palermo, 522 S.W.2d 679, 685-86
(Tenn. 1975).
67. 266 Md. 440, 295 A.2d 223 (1972).
68. Id. at 447, 295 A.2d at 227. As in Krupa and Bucher, the wife had executed an antenup-
tial contract with her husband which indicated their agreement that she use her maiden name
exclusively. See the discussion of these cases at notes 63-65 supra and related text.
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unless she re-registered under her husband's surname. The court of ap-
peals noted the split of authority regarding the marital surname custom
but held that the principles in Krupa more adequately reflected the com-
mon law history of surnames." After noting several earlier Maryland deci-
sions which indicated that a person may adopt any name through usage
absent a fraudulent intent," the court concluded that "the mere fact of
marriage does not, as a matter of law, operate to establish the custom and
tradition of the majority as a rule of law binding upon all." The Stuart
court as well rejected arguments, which an illinois court had earlier found
persuasive,72 that allowing a married woman to register in her pre-marriage
name might result in fraud. By cross-reference notation of the marriage
and change of name, the Board of Supervisors could prevent the possibility
of dual registration by a voter. 3
In Custer v. Bonadies74 a Connecticut court dealt with the seemingly
endless battle between voter registrars and married women wishing to
retain their maiden names. As in Stuart, the registrar in Custer refused to
accept the registration of a married woman who had not used her hus-
band's surname. After noting those cases holding that "custom is law," the
court concluded that it would adopt common law rules only when they are
suited to present circumstances.7 5 The court held that specific Connecticut
statutes were a mere reflection of prevailing custom and did not require a
69. Id, at 445-47, 295 A.2d at 225-26.
70. Erie Ins. Exch. v. Lane, 246 Md. 55, 227 A.2d 231 (1967); Romans v. State, 178 Md.
588, 16 A.2d 642 (1940).
71. 266 Md. at 447, 295 A.2d at 227.
72. People ex rel. Rago v. Lipsky, 327 Ill. App. 63, 63 N.E.2d 642 (Ct. App. 1945).
73. 266 Md. at 450, 295 A.2d at 228.
74. 30 Conn. Supp. 385, 318 A.2d 639 (Super. Ct. of Hartford County 1974).
75. It hardly seems the time for the Connecticut courts to accept an outdated rule of
common-law requiring married women to adopt their spouses' surnames contrary to
our English common-law heritage and to engraft that rule as an exception to the
recognized right of a person to assume any name that he or she wishes to use.
318 A.2d at 641.
Cf. Dunn v. Palermo, 522 S.W.2d 679, 688 (Tenn. 1975), in which the Tennessee Supreme
Court said:
[M]arried women have labored under a form of societal compulsion and economic
coercion which has not been conducive to the assertion of some rights and privileges
of citizenship. The application of a rule of custom and its conversion into a rule of law,
would stifle and chill virtually all progress in the rapidly expanding field of human
liberties. We live in a new day. We cannot create and continue conditions and then
defend their existence by reliance upon the custom thus created. Had we applied the
rules of custom during the last quarter of a century, the hopes, aspirations and dreams
of millions of Americans would have been frustrated and their fruition would have been
impossible.
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woman to adopt a husband's surname upon marriage."8 Thus, the registrar
was required to register Custer under her pre-marriage name.
Several courts since 1972 have encountered requests by married women
to resume use of pre-marriage names after having adopted the surnames
of their husbands. These courts have often commented upon whether a
woman is legally required to adopt the husband's surname upon marriage.
These statements are, of course, dicta because the courts did not confront
directly the issue of whether marriage automatically results in a change in
the woman's name. Most of the statements reflect the view that no change
in name is compelled by law. In Application of Lawrence," a New Jersey
appeals court concluded that a wife is not legally compelled to assume her
husband's surname. In Petition of Hauptly'8 and Walker v. Jackson,"
courts concluded that when a woman marries she assumes her husband's
surname; both courts held, however, that a wife could resume her pre-
marriage name by consistent usage." In re Mohlman' held that there was
no common law requirement that the wife adopt the husband's surname.
Most recently, the Virginia Supreme Court in In re Strikwerdas2 indicated
in dicta that "although a married woman may, as she customarily does,
assume her husband's surname, she is under no legal compulsion to do
"o283
One of the most significant decisions reflecting recent trends of courts
regarding marital surnames is Kruzel v. Podell. s4 In Kruzel, an art teacher,
76. 318 A.2d at 643. Statutes reflecting the prevailing custom in the United States have
often been seized upon by those who assert the wife is required to adopt the husband's
surname. These statutes relate to such matters as notification to licensing or registration
officials "when a name is changed by marriage" (TENN. CODE: ANN. § 59-708(d) (1968) cited
in Dunn v. Palermo, 522 S.W.2d 679, 680 (Tenn. 1975)) and court allowance of the resumption
of a pre-marriage name upon divorce (VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107 (Cum. Supp. 1976) cited in In
re Strikwerda, 216 Va. 470, 472, 220 S.E.2d 245, 246 (1975)). Research has uncovered no case
in which such an argument has been the basis for denying a woman's right to retain or
reassume use of her pre-marriage name. Cf. Dunn v. Palermo, 522 S.W.2d 679, 680 (Tenn.
1975); In re Strikwerda, 216 Va. 470, 472, 220 S.E.2d 245, 246 (1975); Kruzel v. Podell, 67
Wis. 2d 138, 151, 226 N.W.2d 458, 464 (1975).
77. 133 N.J. Super. 408, 412, 337 A.2d 49, 51 (App. Div. 1975), rev'g 128 N.J. Super. 312,
319 A.2d 793 (Bergen County Ct. 1974).
78. 312 N.E.2d 857, 860 (Ind. 1974), rev'g 294 N.E.2d 833 (Ind. Ct. App. 1973) ("under the
common law and by tradition in this country a married woman assumes the surname of her
husband").
79. 391 F. Supp. 1395, 1402 (E.D. Ark. 1975) (the name change by law "was based upon
immemorial custom and usage in England and in this country").
80. Petition of Hauptly, 312 N.E.2d 857, 860 (Ind. 1974).
81. 26 N.C. App. 220, 216 S.E.2d 147 (Ct. App. 1975).
82. 216 Va. 470, 220 S.E.2d 245 (1975).
83. Id. at 472, 220 S.E.2d at 246.
84. 67 Wis. 2d 138, 226 N.W.2d 458 (1975).
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whose teaching certificate was under her pre-marriage name and who had
exhibited her works of art under her pre-marriage name, was required by
the Milwaukee school system to use her husband's surname for group
insurance purposes. She petitioned a court to reinstate her pre-marriage
name through the Wisconsin statute allowing for name changes. The trial
court denied her request because the statute allowed judges to exercise
considerable discretion in acting upon such petitions. 5 The Wisconsin
Supreme Court found it unnecessary to discuss fully the issue of a possible
abuse of discretion by the judge 6 because it held that the petitioner's name
had never changed. Marriage, the court said, does not automatically result
in a name change.17 The marital surname rule was only a custom and
custom in this instance had not ripened into common law." The court
noted that the use of legal encyclopedias and heavy reliance upon Chap-
man v. Phoenix National Bank89 had led many courts to blithely accept
the assertion that marriage changed a woman's name." Other Wisconsin
statutes could not be construed as requiring that a woman change her
name upon marriage." Instead, they represent a recognition of prevailing
custom. The court rejected the contention that Lane v. Duchac2 recog-
nized a requirement that the wife adopt the husband's surname. The court
concluded that the issue of whether a woman's name is automatically
changed by marriage was not reached in Lane.3 By failing to discuss such
a requirement, Lane implicitly recognizes that there was no such common
law requirement. 4 Thus, the common law rule prevailed: a woman may,
but is not required to, adopt her husband's surname. Such adoption is only
one example of the well known common law rule that, absent a fraudulent
intent, a person may change his or her name by usage of the desired
name. 5
Dunn v. Palermo,"' decided by the Tennessee Supreme Court, followed
shortly after the Kruzel decision. The Dunn court extensively explored the
85. The amount of discretion a judge may exercise is discussed in section IV.B. infra.
86. 67 Wis. 2d at 153, 226 N.W.2d at 464-65.
87. Id. at 152, 226 N.W.2d at 463-65.
88. Id., 226 N.W.2d at 463.
89. 85 N.Y. 437 (1881). This and other earlier decisions are discussed in section IH.A.
supra.
90. 67 Wis. 2d at 145-46, 226 N.W.2d at 460.
91. Id. at 151-52, 226 N.W.2d at 465. See note 76 supra.
92. 73 Wis. 646, 41 N.W. 962 (1889).
93. 67 Wis. 2d at 147, 226 N.W.2d at 463. Lane concerned the issue of whether a document
bearing the wife's pre-marriage name was legally sufficient.
94. Id. at 148, 226 N.W.2d at 463.
95. Id. at 154, 226 N.W.2d at 465.
96. 522 S.W.2d 679 (Tenn. 1975).
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common law history of surnames and the American case law relating to the
surnames of married women. Several of the earlier American cases which
had been viewed as establishing a legal change requirement were distin-
guished as relating solely to the issue of notice or other tangential mat-
ters. 7 The court noted that the effect of People ex rel. Rago v. Lipsky"8 had
been diminished by an opinion of the Attorney General of Illinois."
Forbush v. Wallace'00 was interpreted as holding that it was only custom-
ary and traditional for the wife to adopt the husband's surname.10' On the
basis of recent cases and research, the Tennessee court concluded that at
common law "a [married] woman acquired a new name by repute and
that her name was thus changed in fact and not in law.""' Even if the
common law contained such a requirement, the Tennessee Supreme Court
indicated that it would depart from such a view.' 3 Finally, the court
rejected the policy argument that allowing women to retain their pre-
marriage names would result in fraud, confusion and serious administra-
tive problems.
In point of fact, permitting a married woman to retain her own name would
eliminate substantial administrative problems incident to a change of name.
With the rapid increases of divorces and re-marriages in America today,
with attendant name changes, we may reach the point of having to forbid a
change of name by marriage in order to bring about stability, reduce confu-
sion, and preserve the identity of women who acquire a different name from
each successive husband.''
In Weathers v. Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles,' °5 a woman
petitioned for the right to use her pre-marriage name in divorce proceed-
97. Id. at 683-86. Chapman v. Phoenix Nat'l Bank, 85 N.Y. 437 (1881), Roberts v. Grayson,
233 Ala. 658, 173 So. 38 (1937), and Wilty v. Jefferson Parish Democratic Executive Comm.,
245 La. 145, 157 So. 2d 718 (1963), were thus discounted.
98. 327 Ill. App. 63, 63 N.E.2d 642 (Ct. App. 1945). See notes 58 & 59 supra and accom-
panying text.
99. Dunn v. Palermo, 522 S.W.2d 679, 684 (Tenn. 1975).
100. 341 F. Supp. 217 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd without opinion, 405 U.S. 970 (1972).
101. 522 S.W.2d at 686.
102. Id. at 687 (emphasis in original). "It was windblown across the Atlantic Ocean in the
same form and has become a universal practice in this country. But it has never had the force
of law in Tennessee either under our common law or statutes." Id.
103. The common law does not have the force of Holy Writ; it is not a last will and
testament, nor is it a cadaver embalmed in perpetuity, nor is it to be treated like the
sin of Judah -'written with a pen of iron and with the point of a diamond.' Jeremiah
17:1.
Id. at 688. See also note 75 supra.
104. Id.
105. 54 Cal. App. 3d 286, 126 Cal. Rptr. 547 (Ct. App. 1976).
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ings. The petitioner had used her pre-marriage name consistently during
the marriage, but this fact did not sway the judge hearing the case. He first
asserted that marriage itself changed the wife's name'08 and confessed, "I
have never divorced people with two different names; never have."'' 7 The
judge dismissed the case because the petitioner would not file for divorce
under her husband's surname;0 8 the petitioner appealed the judge's refusal
to hear her case under her pre-marriage name. The court of appeals is-
sued a writ of mandate directing the superior court to vacate its order.
"[W]hen a woman marries, she may choose to be known by the surname
of her husband or by her maiden surname,"'0 9 the court concluded.
In Davis v. Roos"0 a Florida appeals court held that a married woman's
application for a driver's license issued in her pre-marriage name must be
processed. The court crystallized the issue clearly"' and determined that
"[a]lthough it is the general custom for a woman to change her name
upon marriage to that of the husband, the law does not compel her to do
so.""' An earlier Florida Supreme Court decision,"' which had held that"at marriage the wife takes the husband's surname. . . but otherwise her
name is not changed,""' was viewed as inapplicable 5 since the sole ques-
tion before that court had been whether a suit styling the defendant as
"Mrs." established that she was a married woman at the time of the suit."'
The district court next examined the Chapman decision and its progeny
and determined that "history or precedent fails to support the Chapman
enunications."" 7 Finally, the court concluded that the decision in Forbush
v. Wallace"' was based upon the belief that Alabama had adopted an
106. When the judge was informed that the petitioner had never adopted the husband's
name, he replied, "That doesn't matter whether you've assumed it or not" and "The marriage
certificate makes you Mrs. Grippa." When the petitioner disagreed, the judge responded,
"They must have an awful novel wedding certificate in Oklahoma [the place of marriage] if
it doesn't." Id. at 288, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 548.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 289, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 549.
109. Id.
110. 326 So. 2d 226 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
111. "Did the recitation of marriage vows between Roos and Burke legally change her name
to that of Burke, even though she rejected it?" Id. at 227.
112. Id. at 229.
113. Carlton v. Phelan, 100 Fla. 1164, 131 So. 117 (1939).
114. Id. at 1170, 131 So. at 119.
115. Davis v. Roos, 326 So. 2d 226, 227 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 228.
118. 341 F. Supp. 217 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd without opinion, 405 U.S. 970 (1972).
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operation-of-law approach to marital surnames.' This interpretation of
common law suggested by the Alabama courts was rejected by the Florida
court.
In summary, these recent decisions have recognized that the conclusions
of Chapman and its progeny are founded upon a false historical premise.
The Chapman progeny failed to distinguish between prevailing custom
and binding common law.' 2 Recent decisions have parted with Chapman
because they recognize this important distinction between custom and
law. At no time was an English wife required by law to assume the surname
of her husband. Once this critical historical determination has been made,
other issues are relatively easy to resolve. Courts are understandably reluc-
tant to hold that non-binding English custom should be considered bind-
ing American law. Adherence to English common law should not result in
a greater dimunition of freedom for American women today than English
women have had for centuries. Precisely because English women had the
freedom to retain their pre-marriage names, American courts are increas-
ingly recognizing that American married women have a similar right.
C. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
If a court interprets the common law as legally requiring that a married
woman adopt the surname of her husband, women wishing to retain their
pre-marriage names may challenge the constitutionality of applying such
a rule to women in the United States. There is very little recent case law
on such constitutional challenges, however, since nearly all recent deci-
sions have rejected such an interpretation of the common law. 12 1
1. Forbush And The "Rational Basis" Test Of Equal Protection
Any constitutional challenge to the marital surname rule must focus
upon the United States Supreme Court's summary affirmance of Forbush
v. Wallace. 22 Petitioner Forbush claimed that Alabama's unwritten policy
119. The conclusion that Alabama has adopted an operation-of-law approach to marital
surnames can be challenged, however, as not bearing upon the issue of whether or not a wife
is required by law to adopt the husband's surname. See note 62 supra.
120. See, e.g., the conclusory statement found in 57 AM. JUR. 2d Name § 9 (1971): "It is
well settled by common-law principles and immemorial custom that a woman upon marriage
abandons her maiden name and assumes the husband's surname," See also the conclusion
of Chapman: "For several centuries, by common law among all English-speaking people, a
woman upon her marriage, takes her husband's surname." (emphasis added).
121. Thus most courts have not had an occasion to reach constitutional questions involving
application of a marital surname requirement. See Stuart v. Board of Supervisors of Elec-
tions, 266 Md. 440, 450, 295 A.2d 223, 228 (1972); Matter of Natale, 527 S.W.2d 402, 407 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1975); Kruzel v. Podell, 67 Wis. 2d 138, 154, 226 N.W.2d 458, 466 (1975).
122. 341 F. Supp. 217 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd without opinion, 405 U.S. 970 (1972).
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of requiring married women to obtain drivers' licenses in their husbands'
surnames was a denial of equal protection under the fourteenth amend-
ment. The three-judge federal district court applied a "rational basis" test
to the claim: "a law is not violative of the Fourteenth Amendment, despite
the existence of discrimination in the technical or broad sense, where the
law at issue maintains some rational connection with a legitimate state
interest."' ' The court noted "the custom of the husband's surname de-
nominating the wedded couple" is a "tradition extending back into the
heritage of most western civilizations."'' 4 In light of "administrative incon-
venience and the cost of a change" to Alabama's licensing program, the
plaintiffs equal protection claim was rejected.' 5 The Supreme Court af-
firmed without opinion the decision of the lower court.'26
Persons and groups displeased with the affirmance have stated that such
a summary affirmance without opinion cannot be considered of the same
precedential weight as a decision made after the submission of briefs and
oral argument.'1 The Supreme Court in Edelman v. Jordan,'5 indicated
that a summary affirmance is "not of the same precedential value as would
be an opinion of this Court treating the question on the merits.' ' 29 A
summary affirmance does, however, have significant precedential value.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Hicks v. Miranda3 ' indicates that
summary affirmances or dismissals by the Supreme Court are binding on
inferior courts "until such time as the Court informs [them] that [they]
are not."'' The primary focus of inquiry in any subsequent case appears
to be whether or not the issues raised in the new case had been presented
to the Court earlier so that its earlier decision constitutes precedent on the
issue to be raised. 32
123. Id. at 222.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 222-23.
126. 405 U.S. 970 (1972).
127. we are attempting to limit the potential harm by urging that a Supreme Court per
curiam affirmance without opinion has scant, if any, precedential value .... We
analogize it to be a denial of certiorari. The disposition was made without briefs and
without hearing argument. Respectable scholarly opinion supports the proposition
that nowadays the Supreme Court manages its obligatory jurisdiction much as it does
its discretionary jurisdiction, so that a disposition of the Forbush kind tells us nothing
of the Court's views on the merits.
R.B. Ginsburg, WOMEN TODAY 7, April 17, 1972, cited in Bysciewicz, Married Women's Sur-
names, 5 CoNN. L. REv. 598, 612 (1973).
128. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
129. Id. at 671.
130. 422 U.S. 332 (1975).
131. Id. at 345.
132. In a footnote, the Court noted that an earlier Supreme Court dismissal for want of a
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While the Hicks decision seems to undermine any significant weight
which might be given to Edelman, "subsequent doctrinal developments"
may weaken the precedential value of an earlier summary affirmance.'1
Supreme Court rulings since Forbush on administrative convenience and
gender classifications may have already undermined the Forbush sum-
mary affirmance. Even though a majority of the Court has not yet consid-
ered gender classification to be a suspect classification meriting strict judi-
cial scrutiny,'34 the Forbush affirmance may be questioned. Recently the
Supreme Court has transformed the "rational basis" test in equal protec-
tion analysis from an unquestioning acceptance of hypothetical justifica-
tions into a test demanding more rigorous scrutiny than was previously
applied.' 5 Furthermore, administrative convenience has been viewed as an
unacceptable reason for discriminating between the sexes.' 3 A Connecticut
court in Custer v. Bonadies'37 relied upon these developments in holding
that a voter registration requirement that married women register under
their husbands' surnames violated the equal protection clause.
One federal district court has held that requiring women to register for
voting under the prefix of "Miss" or "Mrs." violated the equal protection
clause in that it imposed a disclosure of marital status requirement on
women while not likewise imposing such a disclosure requirement upon
men.' A Catholic nun and three other women had asked for registration
substantial federal question is decisive only if the issues raised in the two cases are sufficiently
similar that the earlier decision may be considered controlling precedent. "Ascertaining the
reach and content of summary actions may itself present issues of substance, and in circum-
stances where the constitutionality of a state statute is at stake, that undertaking itself may
be one for a three-judge court." Id. at n.14.
133. Id. at 344.
134. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), in which a plurality of the Court
drew similarities between classifications by sex and race.
Moreover, since sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic
determined solely by accident of birth, the imposition of special disabilities upon the
members of a particular sex because of their sex would seem to violate the basic
concepts of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual
responsibility....
Id. at 686.
A majority of the Court still does not consider sex to be a suspect classification. See Geduldig
v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). Some state courts have done so. Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5
Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971).
135. Compare McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961) (equal protection clause"offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of
the state's objective"), with Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (disallowing preference for men
as administrators of estates). See also Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
136. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
137. 30 Conn. Supp. 385, 318 A.2d 639 (Super. Ct. of Hartford County 1974).
138. Walker v. Jackson, 391 F. Supp. 1395 (E.D. Ark. 1975).
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in terms other than "Miss" or "Mrs." The district court concluded that
such a prefix requirement could not even withstand "rational basis"
scrutiny.
Conceding that the burden that the prefix requirement places upon the fe-
male applicants for registration is slight. . . . the trouble that we have with
the requirement is that the State has no conceivable interest in imposing it.
It has no reasonable or rational basis. . . . [W]e cannot see anything that
the State has to gain by knowing whether a female voter is single, married,
divorced, or a widow. Her marital status is simply irrelevant as far as her
qualifications to vote are concerned.' 3'
However, in A lyn v. Allison, '10 the California Court of Appeals sustained
a voter registration requirement that women identify themselves as "Miss"
or "Mrs." against a challenge that it violated the fourteenth amendment.
The court held that the state had a rational basis for such a requirement
because "under our law the woman upon marriage takes the name of the
husband."' 4 In order to discover previous registrations, a registrar may
require identification by the titles "Miss" or "Mrs.' ' 2 The fact that a man
is not required to disclose his marital status raises no equal protection
problem because a man's name does not change at marriage.", One judge
concurred but noted that a woman might use either "Miss" or "Mrs."
regardless of marital status.' The California legislature later alleviated
the problem by allowing a third category of "Ms.' 45
Notwithstanding the Allyn decision, it appears that prefix and marital
surname requirements are subject to vigorous constitutional challenge
even under the "rational basis" test. Although the precedential value of
the Forbush affirmance may have been strengthened by Hicks, various
139. Id. at 1403.
140. 34 Cal. App. 3d 448, 110 Cal. Rptr. 77 (Ct. App. 1973).
141. Id. at 452, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Apart from general custom I find no essential connection between marital
status and use of the titles, MISS and MRS. Actresses today, even those who have
married as many times as the sands of the sea, use the title MISS. In past centuries
the practice was the precise opposite, and actresses and authoresses used the title
MRS. regardless of marital status .... Nor was this custom limited to women of
public life, for during the 17th and 18th centuries usage of the title MRS. by unmarried
women in private life was common .... In my view a female voter registrant is free
to use either of the two authorized descriptive titles, MISS or MRS., regardless of
marital status.
Id. at 454-55, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
145. See Karst, "A Discrimination So Trivial": A Note on the Law and the Symbolism of
Women's Dependency, 35 OHmO ST. L.J. 546, 554 (1974).
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courts seem unwilling to reject the equal protection challenge to such
requirements.
2. Other Constitutional Challenges
In the aftermath of the Supreme Court's summary affirmance of
Forbush v. Wallace, many writers suggested several constitutional rights
as being associated with the right to retain a pre-marriage name.'46 These
constitutional claims have not been fully tested because courts have been
able to grant relief without reaching the constitutional issues.'47
In addition to equal protection, other constitutional rights have been
considered as possible grounds for attacking marital surname require-
ments. Some writers have suggested that any marital surname require-
ment arguably deprives a married woman of a property interest in her
name and reputation without due process.' Others have argued that a
marital surname requirement is an abridgment of freedom of speech'49 or
an invasion of the right of privacy.'50 In light of the recent trend, indicating
that no common law marital surname requirement exists, it seems increas-
ingly unlikely that many courts will have to address these constitutional
issues. Instead, courts will most likely follow this recent trend which ren-
ders moot constitutional issues associated with the right to retain a pre-
marriage name.
IV. REASSUMING THE PRE-MARRIAGE NAME
Those women who have adopted their husbands' surnames through
usage' 5' or by operation of law may nevertheless be able to regain the use
146. See articles cited in note 5 supra.
147. Because these various constitutional challenges have been adequately explored else-
where and remain fundamentally unchanged, no attempt is made here to discuss them
exhaustively. The reader is referred to articles cited passim.
148. See Comment, Married Woman's Right to Her Maiden Name: The Possibilities for
Change, 23 BUFFALO L. REV. 243, 254-55 (1973); Comment, Pre-Marriage Name Change,
Resumption, and Registration Statutes, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1508, 1513 (1974); Comment, A
Woman's Right to Her Name, 21 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 665, 685-87 (1973).
149. See, e.g., Comment, A Woman's Right to Her Name, 21 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 665, 683-85
(1973).
150. See Comment, The Right of Women to Use Their Maiden Names, 38 ALBANY L. REV.
105, 123 (1973); Comment, Pre-Marriage Name Change, Resumption and Registration
Statutes, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1508, 1513 (1974) (acknowledging that such an interpretation
would require an extension of the right of privacy); Comment, A Woman's Right to Her
Name, 21 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 665, 680-83 (1973).
151. At common law any person could adopt a new name by consistently and exclusively
using it. The wife adopted the husband's surname by usage and not by operation of law. See
notes 43-45 supra and accompanying text.
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of their pre-marriage names as their "legal names" through a state's proce-
dures for changing a name. All states have statutes providing for change
of name petitions. These statutes, as interpreted by state courts, vary
significantly from state to state. There is, however, remarkable similarity
in the questions discussed by various state courts which have interpreted
such statutes.
Generally, an appellate court reviewing a lower court's decision on a
change of name petition will find it necessary to address the following
questions: (1) Is the change of name statute intended to be in abrogation
of the common law right of adoption by usage? (2) How much, if any,
judicial discretion may be exercised in reviewing petitions for a change of
name? and (3) What factors should affect a court's decision?
A. Is THE STATUTE IN ABROGATION OF COMMON LAW RIGHTS?
As discussed above,' 2 at common law surnames were never viewed as
immutable; a person could adopt a new surname without legal formalities
by merely using that name exclusively, consistently and nonfraudulently.
The relationship between this common law right to change a surname at
will and state statutes outlining statutory methods for changing a name is
of critical importance. Courts must clearly determine whether the statute
providing for change of names was intended to be in abrogation of the
common law right. If the statute merely supplements the common law
right, a person may still change his or her name by usage without resorting
to the statutory machinery. If, however, the statute is viewed as abrogating
the common law right, a person must follow statutory procedures in order
to change his or her legal name.
1. Majority View: Statutes Supplement Common Law
Prior to the flurry of decisions regarding a married woman's name, most
courts had already interpreted statutes prescribing a procedure for the
change of names as merely supplementary of the common law right to
change a name without legal proceedings.' 3 Such statutes were held to
152. See notes 43-45 supra and accompanying text.
153. Clinton v. Morrow, 220 Ark. 377, 247 S.W.2d 1015 (1952); Application of McGehee,
174 Cal. App. 25, 304 P.2d 167 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956); Don v. Don, 142 Conn. 309, 114 A.2d
203 (1955); Degenberg v. McCormick, 184 A.2d 468 (Del. Ch. 1962); Reinken v. Reinken, 351
Ill. 409, 184 N.E. 639 (1933); Hall v. Hall, 30 Md. App. 214, 351 A.2d 917 (1976); Petition of
Buyarsky, 322 Mass. 335, 77 N.E.2d 216 (1948); Petition of Merolevitz, 320 Mass. 448, 70
N.E.2d 249 (1946); In re Taminosian, 97 Neb. 514, 150 N.W. 824 (1915); In re Slobody, 173
N.Y.S. 515 (Sup. Ct. 1918); Kay v. Kay, 65 Ohio Abstr. 472, 112 N.E.2d 562 (C.P. Cuyahoga
County 1953); In re Everetts Appeal, 392 S.W.2d 781, 783 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1965) (acknow-
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provide a method for recording a change so that the name change might
occur quickly and efficiently. Most legislatures did not indicate whether
the statutory procedure was intended to be the exclusive means of chang-
ing one's name. Thus, state courts were reluctant to infer an intent to
abrogate the common law right of surname flexibility. 4
Courts reviewing petitions from married women wishing to reassume
their pre-marriage names have held that change of name statutes do not
abrogate the common law right of adoption through usage in the following
states: Missouri, 5  California,' 5' Connecticut," 7 Indiana,5 8 New York,' 59
Arizona' 0 and New Jersey."' Other state courts have adopted this position
ledging general rule without commenting upon it). Cf. Petition of Falcucci, 355 Pa. 558, 50
A.2d 200 (1947) (individual must use statutory method).
154. The court in Smith v. United States Casualty Co., 197 N.Y. 420, 90 N.E. 947 (1910),
one of the earlier decisions discussing the relationship between a change of name statute and
this common law right, concluded:
[Tihis legislation is simply in affirmance and aid of the common law to make a
definite point of time when the change shall take effect .... It does not repeal the
common law by implication or otherwise, but gives an additional method of effecting
a change of name. The statutory method [of effecting a change] has some advantages,
because it is speedy, definite, and a matter of record so as to be easily proved even
after the death of all contemporaneous witnesses.
Id. at 429, 90 N.E. at 950.
155. Matter of Natale, 527 S.W.2d 402, 405 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) ("The primary difference
between the two methods is, therefore, the speed and certainty of the change of name under
the statutory procedure. . . .While no Missouri case has yet considered the relationship
between the common law and statutory methods of name change, the court's view that the
common law and statutory methods of changing name coexist is consistent with the language
of. . .[the statutory provision] since. . .[it] does not expressly abrogate the common law
or invalidate the common law by inconsistency.").
156. In re Marriage of Banks, 42 Cal. App. 3d 631, 637, 117 Cal. Rptr. 37, 41-42 (Ct. App.
1974) (statute "enacted in affirmation of this common law right"; anyone may change a name
through nonfraudulent usage). Accord, Weathers v. Superior Ct., 54 Cal. App. 3d 286, 288,
126 Cal. Rptr. 547, 549 (Ct. App. 1976).
157. Custer v. Bonadies, 30 Conn. Supp. 385, 318 A.2d 639, 640 (Super. Ct. Hartford
County 1974) ("Connecticut has adopted this common law rule, which operates indepen-
dently of any court order.").
158. Petition of Hauptly, 312 N.E.2d 857, 859-60 (Ind. 1974) ("...there is no legal require-
ment that any person go through the courts to establish a legal change of name.").
159. Application of Halligan, 46 App. Div. 2d 170, 171, 361 N.Y.S.2d 458, 459 (1974) ("The
statute affirms this [common law] right and the two procedures exist side by side supple-
menting each other .... ").
160. Laks v. Laks, 25 Ariz. App. 58, 540 P.2d 1277, 1279 (Ct. App. 1975) (change of
children's name to hyphenated form reflecting the surnames of both wife and husband;
statutes "merely affirm and are in aid of the common law rule. They do not repeal the
common law by implication or otherwise, but afford an additional method of affecting a name
change.").
161. Application of Lawrence, 133 N.J. Super. 408, 411, 337 A.2d 49, 50 (App. Div. 1975),
rev'g 128 N.J. Super. 312, 319 A.2d 793 (Bergen County Ct. 1974) (statutory procedure "has
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when reviewing other types of petitions.12 Some courts have stated that the
statutory procedure should be interpreted in a manner which would not
minimize the common law right; it is nevertheless unclear whether these
decisions view the statutory procedure as the exclusive means of changing
one's name.'6 3
Whether or not a statutory procedure is the sole method of changing a
name affects significantly a court's determination of the proper amount of
judicial discretion. Courts holding that the common law change of name
rights are not abrogated are reluctant to vest significant discretionary pow-
ers in judges. A person whose request for a change of name had been denied
could, in a dual method jurisdiction, legally adopt the desired name by
usage. A state's best interests are served by having a record of all changes
of names. Therefore, in dual method jurisdictions, a judge's discretion is
frequently limited to determining whether the request for a change of name
is fraudulent.' 4
2. A Vociferous Minority: Abrogation
For many years, it has been suggested that the common law right of
adoption by usage without requiring legal proceedings should be signifi-
cantly restricted or abandoned altogether. Three very distinct reasons have
been presented by these critics of the common law right.
First, it is argued that a person has a property interest in his or her name
which should not be subject to appropriation by another. This position was
forcefully articulated with unfortunately racist overtones when immigra-
tion to North America resulted in significant resentment against those
immigrants who adopted "reputable surnames."'6 5 These unfortunate
been construed consistently in light of and not in derogation of the common law, which it
does not supercede.").
162. See note 153 supra and accompanying text.
163. See, e.g., Kruzel v. Podell, 67 Wis. 2d 138, 153, 226 N.W.2d 458, 465 (1975) ("the
statutes merely affirm, and do not abrogate, the common law."). The Kruzel court stated
that a judge should grant any request unless it is fraudulent. One could argue that the
statutory procedure was thus intended to replace the common law method of usage by provid-
ing an exclusive statutory form of the common law principles. See also Ogle v. Circuit Court,
227 N.W.2d 621, 624 (S.D. 1975) (statutes do not supplant this [common law] right but aid
it by the official recordation of those changes).
164. See note 193 infra and accompanying text.
165. One writer roused his audience with this memorable rhetoric:
Was such a [noble and highly regarded] name one on which an alien should be
allowed to wipe his dirty feet? . . . Have the legitimate owners of a patronymic no
right to protect it from theft by those who possess no natural claim upon it? Can no
family nest throw out those foreign cuckoo eggs?
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comments reflect, however, the principle of the civil law that a person does
have a property interest in his or her name.'66 Consequently, in nations
following the civil law, the appropriation of another person's name is dis-
couraged.6 7 In common law jurisdictions, a person's petition for a change
of name is not generally denied on the basis of property interest in a
personal name.'68
Second, it is often suggested that allowing a person to adopt a new name,
especially without requiring legal proceedings, creates chaos and confusion
in an extremely mobile society.'69 It is important, of course, to distinguish
Gordon, Change of Patronymic, 56 CANADA L.J. 1, 6 (1920). Gordon continues his argument
in the following fashion:
In England, America and Canada there exist family names which have been conse-
crated in the history of our race, and which are repeated with reverence whenever
referred to. In most American States any one of these honored names can be assumed
by any citizen who, perhaps in his dealings with the police, judges it desirable to adopt
a new alias; or by any unwashed immigrant from Central Europe who finds that his
cognomen too clearly reveals his ancestry and race to make living among loyal
communities pleasant.
Id. at 6-7.
A less rousing, but nonetheless similar argument is found in Dwight, Proper Names, 20
YALE L.J. 387 (1911). Dwight posits:
A very familiar illustration of one aspect of this fact [of the importance of a name] is
found in the way we associate names with racial skill and capacity to an extent
probably known nowhere else in the world. . . . While socially the names peculiar to
the stocks, Anglo-Saxon, Dutch and Huguenot, that founded the nation and still
predominate command a prestige that is undeniable. Moreover, this advantage inheres
not so much in any one name as in the sound. It is the suggestion of race affiliation
that counts, not the belonging to one particular branch of family.
Id. at 389.
Dwight suggests that no one be allowed to assume a name already born by others but
instead be compelled to "coin one" by translation or "by the arbitrary assemblage of letters."
Id. at 392.
166. ARNOLD, supra note 23, at 230-31.
167. Id.
168. Hence, a person who is proud of the heritage of his name may not prevent another
from adopting his name unless the use of his name is fraudulent. "[Tihis is one of the
incidents of living in a world in which there are not a sufficient number of distinctive patro-
nymics to allow each individual to monopolize one." Petition of Falcucci, 355 Pa. 588, 592,
50 A.2d 200, 202 (1947). Accord, In re Useldinger, 35 Cal. App. 2d 723, 96 P.2d 958 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1939); Petition of Buyarsky, 322 Mass. 335, 77 N.E.2d 216 (1948); Application of Ferris,
178 Misc. 534, 34 N.Y.S.2d 909 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
169. The importance of names "accrues only as civilization becomes complex, with agreatly increased mingling of people, the multiplication of written records, and the growing
necessity for preserving identities." Dwight, Proper Names, 20 YALE L.J. 387, 389 (1911).
The common law rule is often considered to be . . . totally without any rational
justification in an age when so much depends on written records and courts are readily
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between requiring that a person initiate legal proceedings in order to ob-
tain a change of name and imposing additional requirements before such
a change is granted. It is, for example, possible for a state to codify the
common law rule as the exclusive method of changing a name. In order to
do this, a state must limit denials of requests to instances where the peti-
tion is motivated by fraud. The jurisdictions, however, which seemingly
hold that such a statutory method is exclusive have often added other
requirements which must also be met.7 0
The third group of critics are those who believe that requirements in
addition to a lack of fraudulent intent should be imposed. This group often
argues that changes of names are disruptive to society even when a record
of the changes is made. Persons who are not before a court which is review-
ing a proposed change of name may not be protected if the court only
examines the issue of fraudulent intent. Thus, additional criteria should
be imposed in order to protect these parties.' The exact nature of these
added factors is considered later in this article.'
A few jurisdictions clearly hold that the statutory procedure is the sole
means available for changing a name. A Louisiana statute,7 3 which begins
"Whenever any person. . . desires to change his or her name," has been
interpreted by the Louisiana Attorney General as providing the only proce-
dure for changing one's name.' The Maine Supreme Court held in In re
Reben " that similar language in the Maine statute outlining name change
procedures indicated that the statutory method was exclusive. The Maine
court indicated that other statutes which had been interpreted by courts
in other jurisdictions as establishing a second method of changing a name
seem to impose criteria in addition to the common law requisite.17 The
Maine statute was viewed as an incorporation of "the essential philosophy
of the earlier practice."'7 Thus, the common law method was no longer
accessible. As transportation facilities improve and communities become more fluid,
identities of individuals and their whereabouts conceivably could be lost to members
of their families, creditors, and others desiring to locate them unless public records are
kept of all name changes.
Comment, The Right to Change One's Name, 5 J. FAMILy L. 220, 227 (1965).
170. See notes 205-09 infra and accompanying text.
171. See, e.g., Comment, The Right to Change One's Name, 5 J. FAMILY L. 220, 224-26
(1965).
172. See section IV.C. infra.
173. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:4751 (Cum. Supp. 1976) (emphasis added).
174. 1942-1944 Op. ATr'y GEN. LA. 963.
175. 342 A.2d 688 (Me. 1975).
176. Id. at 694.
177. Id. at 693. Yet the court construed "the present statute as necessarily including several
implied standards in addition to that of absence of fraudulent intent." Id. at 695 (emphasis
in original).
1976]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
useful or desirable. The North Carolina Court of Appeals seemingly held
in In re Mohlman'75 that the statutory procedure constituted the exclusive
method of changing a name. The court first concluded that the common
law was in force in North Carolina when not abrogated or repealed by
statute or repugnant to North Carolina's form of government."9 It then
found it "interesting to note" that the Constitution of North Carolina gave
the General Assembly the power to pass general laws regulating the altera-
tion of names.' s5 Although it took notice of the fact that "it is generally held
that these statutes do not abrogate the common law rule,"'' 8' the court
seemed to indicate that the North Carolina statute abrogated the common
law right of usage. '
Other states have statutes which have been interpreted by state attor-
neys general as providing the exclusive method for changing a name, in-
cluding Georgia13 and Virginia. The Virginia Attorney General has indi-
cated that a woman who has adopted her husband's surname "may obtain
a reinstatement of her maiden name only by proceedings in accordance
with" the Virginia statute outlining procedures for a change of name.',
Although the Virginia Supreme Court in In re Strikwerda' 5 did not reach
this question, it seems that Virginia may have by statute abrogated the
common law method of adoption by usage.'88 Most state attorneys general
178. 26 N.C. App. 220, 216 S.E.2d 147 (Ct. App. 1975).
179. Id. at 225, 216 S.E.2d at 150.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. However, with the increasing mobility of our society, and the growing depend-
ence upon credit cards, automated check cashers, charge accounts, computerized re-
cord keeping both in commerce and in government, numerous name changes can lead
to chaotic confusion. Thus, it appears completely obvious that to provide a procedure
whereby one can secure a change of name through legal procedure with a provision for
proper recordation thereof among the public records is desirable and far less objection-
able, than the common law provision. . . .Our General Assembly, recognizing there
are circumstances under which a legally sanctioned change of name may be warranted
• ..has provided the procedure [for changing a name].
Id. at 227-28, 216 S.E.2d at 151 (emphasis added).
An old Alabama decision, Comer v. Jackson, 50 Ala. 384, 387 (1839), indicates in dicta that
"a party may not change his name, without a proper proceeding in court. . . but he may
adopt as many other names as he pleases." A person thus may assume various names but
cannot change his legal name without court proceedings in Alabama.
183. See Op. ATr'y GEN. GA. 74-33 (March 15, 1974) ("the only way in which [the individ-
ual involved] could legally change his name").
184. See 1972-1973 REPORTS OF THE ATrORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA 182 (June 6, 1973).
185. 216 Va. 470, 220 S.E.2d 245 (1975).
186. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-577.1 (Cum. Supp. 1976) states that "[i]f any person residing in
this State changes his name or assumes another name unlawfully, he shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor." It is possible to read this statute as meaning that any assumption of a new
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have adopted the position that statutes outlining procedures for changes
of names do not abrogate the common law right of adoption by usage.8 7
3. Implications of Abrogation
A conclusion that persons may change surnames only by using the statu-
tory procedure would seem to require that a woman wishing to adopt her
husband's surname go through the statutory procedure as well. In order to
accomplish the statutory purpose of having a record of each name change,
it would be necessary to record all changes. Because it is not legally re-
quired that a wife adopt her husband's surname, such adoption is accom-
plished in most jurisdictions by nonfraudulent usage. If the common law
right of adoption by usage has been abrogated by the statutory procedure
for changing a name, the only method available for a woman wishing to
adopt her husband's surname is the utilization of the statutory procedure.
In a jurisdiction holding that adoption by usage has been abrogated, a wife
would retain her pre-marriage name as her legal name regardless of her
usage of the husband's surname unless she went through the statutory
procedures.'
The decision of whether or not the common law right of adoption by
usage has been abrogated is clearly a decision with many consequences. A
jurisdiction which allows for two methods of changing names - the com-
mon law and statutory methods - will generally be pressured to pattern
the statutory method after the common law principles. In order to encour-
age people's utilization of the statute, the basis for denial of a petition may
name unless authorized by statutory proceedings is illegal. It is also possible to read the
passage narrowly, as only forbidding the fraudulent use of another's name. Although the
Supreme Court of Virginia made reference to this portion of the statute in In re Strikwerda,
216 Va. 470, 473, 220 S.E.2d 245, 247 (1975), it is unclear how the court interpreted this
language of the statute.
187. See, e.g., Op. ATr'Y GEN. ILL. S-695 (February 13, 1974) and S-711 (February 25, 1974);
Op. ATr'Y Gz. MICH. No. 4834 (October 2, 1974); Op. ATr'y GzN. PA. Nos. 62 (August 20,
1973) ("The notion that a woman loses her prior idenity [sic] by marrying is a weed that
has flourished too long in this society."), 72 (October 25, 1973) and 8 (January 31, 1974); Op.
ATr'v GEN. S.C. No. 3796 (June 6, 1974) (can either use court proceeding "or by the common
law right to adopt a name you desire by general usage"); Op. Arr'y GEN. VT. No. 179 (Febru-
ary 4, 1974) ("Importantly this statute is not exclusive, on its face; it does not purport to
abrogate the common law of names."); 63 Op. ATr'v GEN. Wis. 501 (October 7, 1974).
188. Many states have for this reason added exceptions to their statutes which allow for
women to change their names by usage upon marriage. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 210 §
12 (1969) (except upon adoption or a woman's marriage or divorce, no change of name is
lawful unless made by a court for a sufficient reason); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 401.010 (1972)
(change of name statute excludes married women; state attorney general holds that married
women may change their names without legal proceedings); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 1637
(1961) (statutory procedure is exclusive; may change a name upon marriage, however).
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be restricted significantly. Otherwise, people who could not obtain a name
change by statute would merely avail themselves of the common law
method, which is neither precise nor requires a record of any name change.
If a state wishes to obtain a record of all name changes or wishes to impose
prerequisites in addition to the absence of fraud for all name changes, it
may be necessary to abrogate the common law method. A jurisdiction
holding that the common law right has been abrogated may restrict
changes in legal names more easily, for a person must meet any criteria
specified in the statutory method in order to change his or her legal name.
Yet these jurisdictions, in order to be consistent, may have to require that
a married woman wishing to adopt her husband's surname go through
statutory procedures in order to change her name. Consistency may also
require that such jurisdictions impose the same criteria upon such a
woman as is done in other change of name petitions.'5 It is possible that
an exclusively "statutory method" state, wishing to restrict the number of
name changes, could inadvertently impose statutory prerequisites that a
married woman wishing to adopt the husband's surname could not meet.
Clearly, before a state court or legislature decides to abrogate the common
law right, it should carefully assess the probable ramifications of its deci-
sion.
B. How MUCH JUDICIAL DISCRETION?
The issue of how much discretion a judge has in reviewing a petition
requesting a change of name has troubled many courts. Courts have inter-
preted statutes which seemingly allow considerable discretion in such a
fashion that little discretion is actually given. While court rulings and
statutes allow for varying degrees of discretion, it is possible to categorize
discretionary powers into three forms: minimum, intermediate and maxi-
mum judicial discretion.
1. Minimum Judicial Discretion
Many court decisions and statutes clearly envision the granting of any
change of name petition unless it appears that the request is motivated by
fraud. In these jurisdictions, a judge's discretion is limited to a determina-
tion of whether the request is fraudulent. Absent any evidence that the
189. If North Carolina has in fact abrogated the common law method, then a married
woman wishing to adopt her husband's name would have to demonstrate "good and sufficient
reasons" for the contemplated change. In re Mohlman, 26 N.C. App. 220, 216 S.E.2d 147 (Ct.
App. 1975), would seem to require that such a petitioner offer evidence in order to establish"good and sufficient reasons." Averments that the request is made for "personal and profes-
sional reasons" would not be sufficient. Id. at 228, 216 S.E.2d at 152.
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request is fraudulent, the judge must grant a petition requesting the
change.
A significant number of jurisdictions have held that a judge's discretion
is limited to a determination of fraudulent intent. The Tennessee Supreme
Court in Dunn v. Palermo'1° seemingly went even further by indicating
that any petition which enumerates the reasons for the proposed change
should be granted.' 9' The Indiana Supreme Court, in interpreting a statu-
tory provision that a judge "may change the names of natural persons on
application by petition,""'9 concluded that
[t]he only duty of the trial court upon the finding of such a petition is to
determine that there is no fraudulent intent involved. Once having so found,
we hold it is an abuse of judicial discretion to deny an application for a
change of name under the statute.' 3
The Virginia Supreme Court in 1975 stated that the inclusion within the
relevant statute of criminal penalties for one who assumes another name
unlawfully "suggests that, in the absence of an illegal purpose, a change
of name petition should be granted."'94 The court drew this conclusion
after noting that the statute (allowing a court "in its discretion" to order
changes of names) provided no guidelines for the exercise of discretion. 5
Several states, such as Oklahoma,"' Alabama" 7 and Vermont"' have by
statute limited a judge's discretion in reviewing petitions.
2. Intermediate Judicial Discretion
Most jurisdictions have statutes which, as interpreted by the courts, vest
considerably more discretion with the court than a mere determination of
190. 522 S.W.2d 679 (Tenn. 1975).
191. All that is required is that a live person file a sworn application in the proper
court of the county of his residence "giving his reasons for desiring the change." There
is no requirement that the reasons be good and sufficient; just that they be given.
Id. at 680.
192. IND. ANN. STAT. § 34-4-6-1 (1973).
193. Petition of Hauptly, 312 N.E.2d 857, 860 (Ind. 1974).
194. In re Strikwerda, 216 Va. 470, 473, 220 S.E.2d 245, 247 (1975).
195. Id. The Virginia Supreme Court concluded that the absence of guidelines was a
statutory omission that "may deserve consideration by the General Assembly." Id.
196. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1634 (1961) states that all petitions should be granted
unless the "court finds that the change is sought for an illegal or fraudulent purpose or that
a material allegation in the petition is false."
197. ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 278 (1958), allowing for changes of names, does not include any
language suggesting that a court has discretion in granting such requests.
198. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 811 (1974), allowing for changes of names, does not include
any language suggestive of discretion.
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whether the petitioner is motivated by fraud. The California statute,'99
providing that a judge should grant a petition if it "may seem right and
proper," is typical of this intermediate discretion. While this statute and
others similar to it vest seemingly significant discretionary powers, courts
have determined that in the absence of any evidence that harm will result,
the judge should grant such petitions.10  Some states shift the burden of
proof to third parties objecting to the petition." ' Petitions which are unop-
posed are often presumed to be valid. 02 Often statutes which convey an
uncertain amount of discretionary power are construed in such a fashion
as to limit a judge's discretion." 3
A judge within a state allowing for intermediate discretion either by
statute or court decision may properly consider factors other than the
possible fraudulency of the petition. At the same time, however, the
judge's discretion is bridled in the various methods outlined above. The
fact that the petitioner usually does not bear the burden of proving "good
cause" is perhaps the most significant limitation upon the judge's discre-
tion.
3. Maximum Judicial Discretion
Some jurisdictions require that the petitioner establish sufficient justifi-
cation for the proposed change of name. The Alaska statute outlining
procedures for a change of name is typical:
[N]o change of name of a person may be made unless the court finds suffi-
cient reasons for the change and also finds it consistent with the public
interests. 20'
The North Carolina Court of Appeals in 1975 determined that the relevant
North Carolina statute," 5 providing that a person may have a name
199. CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE § 1278 (West 1972).
200. See, e.g., Matter of Natale, 527 S.W.2d 402 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (must have evidence
that third parties will be harmed in order to deny requests); Kruzel v. Podell, 67 Wis. 2d 138,
153, 226 N.W.2d 458, 466 (1975) (interpreting statute requiring that requests be granted "if
no sufficient cause is shown to the contrary").
201. See, e.g., In re Banks, 42 Cal. App. 3d 631, 117 Cal. Rptr. 37 (Ct. App. 1974).
202. See, e.g., Application of Halligan, 46 App. Div. 2d 170, 361 N.Y.S.2d 458 (App. Div.
1974).
203. See, e.g., Marshall v. State, 301 So. 2d 477, 478 (Fla. D. Ct. App. 1974) (request should
be granted unless filed for an illegal purpose or unless it invades another's property interest).
204. ALAs. STAT. § 09.55.010 (Supp. 1975). It is noteworthy that the Alaska statute adds
that a ". . . change of name upon marriage or divorce meets these requirements." See also
ARK. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-801 to -803 (1962) ("upon good reasons shown").
205. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 101-02 (1972).
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changed if "good cause [is] shown," imposed upon the petitioner a burden
of going forward with evidence establishing that the change would be justi-
fled.0 6 A mere averment by the petitioner that she wishes to reassume her
pre-marriage name for "personal and professional reasons" is not sufficient
even if it is clear that the petition does not result from fraudulent mo-
tives."7 States which impose a burden of proof upon the petitioner may
considerably enlarge a court's discretion in reviewing petitions. Discretion
is seemingly unbridled by evidence submitted' or limitation upon conjec-
ture"' precisely because it is the petitioner who must convince the court
of the petition's merits.
Many state statutes use language that a judge "may make an order
changing the name . "... ,,2, While these statutes seemingly vest signifi-
cant discretion in the court, statutes similar to these have often been
interpreted as vesting little discretion.2 1 1 In the absence of a state court
ruling actually defining the nature and extent of the judge's discretion, the
amount of discretion conveyed may remain unclear.
It is, of course, obvious that the amount of discretion which a court may
exercise is of critical importance in determining whether a petition should
be granted. Before determining the issue of discretion, it is advisable that
a court examine the underlying policy considerations which are operative.
Courts in jurisdictions which have not abrogated the common law right to
change a legal name by usage without legal proceedings will generally wish
to minimize a judge's discretion. 1 2 Courts in jurisdictions which have abro-
gated the common law right should determine whether the statutory proce-
dure was provided in order to restrict the number of name changes or
merely to provide a record of any changes. 22 If the statute was intended
to restrict name changes, judicial discretion should be maximized. A stat-
206. In re Mohlman, 26 N.C. App. 220, 228, 216 S.E.2d 147, 151-52 (1975).
207. Id.
208. Cf. Matter of Natale, 527 S.W.2d 402, 406 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
209. Cf. Petition of Hauptly, 312 N.E.2d 857, 860 (Ind. 1974) (mere speculation that chil-
dren will be embarrassed by mother's change of name). In instances where the petitioner
would carry the burden of showing "good cause," she might have to present evidenre that
the children would not be harmed.
210. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 7-804 (Supp. 1975). See also ARiz. REV. STAT. § 12-601 (1956); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 5901-05 (Supp. 1975); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 401.010 (1972); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. 19 § 781 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
211. See notes 192-95 supra and accompanying text.
212. See Petition of Hauptly, 312 N.E.2d 857 (Ind. 1974). Other courts interpreting statutes
not abrogating the common law have restricted the amount of judicial discretion signifi-
cantly. See cases cited in notes 155-61 supra.
213. See discussion of the criticism of the common law rule at notes 169-72 supra and
accompanying text.
1976]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
ute, however, solely intended to provide a record of change should be
interpreted as allowing for very little judicial discretion.
C. WHAT FACTORS MAY BE CONSIDERED?
Those courts deciding that factors in addition to possible fraudulent
motives may be considered must determine whether the interests of third
parties not before the court might be adversely affected. Three factors have
been frequently examined by courts reviewing petitions to restore a
woman's pre-marriage name.
1. Burden To Recordkeeping
Several courts, concerned with questions of administrative agencies'
abuse of discretion in denying women the right to use pre-marriage names,
have held that the added burden to recordkeeping justified a denial of
women's petitions.214 More recent decisions have, however, demonstrated
the weakness of this argument, especially when used as a basis for denying
a petition for a change of name. Confusion "is a normal concomitant of any
name change"215 rather than an impediment justifying denial of requests
to resume use of a pre-marriage name. More importantly, the logical exten-
sion of this type of reasoning would mitigate against any request for a
change of name, including those of women wishing to adopt their hus-
bands' surnames. Indeed, the rising divorce rate and increasing rate of
remarriage might eventually lead to "forbid[ding] a change of name by
marriage in order to bring about stability, reduce confusion and preserve
the identity of women who acquire a different name from each successive
husband. 216 The rights of creditors are not necessarily jeopardized by the
reassumption of the pre-marriage name. 217 Indeed, the current practice of
wives adopting the surnames of husbands seems much more burdensome
than the retention or resumption of pre-marriage surnames by married
women.218 Thus, the concern for possible confusion or a burden to record-
214. See, e.g., Forbush v. Wallace, 341 F. Supp. 217, 222 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd without
opinion, 405 U.S. 970 (1972) ("The confusion which would result if each driver were allowed
to obtain licenses in any number of names he desired is obvious."); People ex rel. Rago v.
Lipsky, 327 Ill. App. 63, 63 N.E.2d 642 (Ct. App. 1945) (allowing voter registration of woman
in her pre-marriage name would promote fraud and confusion).
215. Application of Halligan, 46 App. Div. 2d 170, 172, 361 N.Y.S.2d 458, 460 (1974);
accord, Application of Lawrence, 133 N.J. Super. 408, 337 A.2d 49, 52 (App. Div. 1975).
216. Dunn v. Palermo, 522 S.W.2d 679, 688 (Tenn. 1975).
217. Matter of Natale, 527 S.W.2d 402, 406 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
218. Those courts reasoning that the burden to recordkeeping is a justification for denying
petitions fail to explain adequately why the administrative burden of a change they condone
(the adoption by a wife of her husband's surname) is less than that of the change they oppose
(the resumption of the pre-marriage name by a married woman).
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keeping should not ordinarily be a reason for denying a woman's petition
to reassume her pre-marriage name.
2. The Consent Of The Husband
Not very many courts have directly confronted the issue of whether the
spouse's consent to a change of name can be made a prerequisite for the
change. Most husbands in reported cases have actively supported their
wives' decisions to resume use of their pre-marriage names."9 Other courts
have inferred that the husband has consented to a change of name.2
Earlier cases placed some emphasis on the husband's consent as witnessed
in an antenuptial contract which provided that the woman was to retain
her pre-marriage name. 2 ' More recent cases have either not considered the
husband's consent '2 or seemingly considered it as almost an incidental
factor.2 3 No recent reported decision has been forced to decide the merits
of a married woman's petition to change her name over the objections of
her husband.
It is important to note that this issue of consent does not necessarily
involve policy questions of whether the husband and wife should have
common surnames in order to foster a symbol of family unity.2 2 Those
courts which have recently mentioned the question of consent have been
219. See Matter of Natale, 527 S.W.2d 402, 406 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) ("Since the peti-
tioner's husband joined in her petition, no harm to him can be presumed."); Application of
Lawrence, 133 N.J. Super. 408, 414, 337 A.2d 49, 52 (App. Div. 1975) ("We conclude that, in
circumstances such as here where the husband consents to his wife's resumption of the
maiden name, the denial of the plaintiff's application was without warrant ... "); In re
Strikwerda, 216 Va. 470, 473, 220 S.E.2d 245, 247 (1975).
220. In re Reben, 342 A.2d 688, 695 (Me. 1975) ("If one spouse has the right to object to
the other's petition, Mr. Reben's appearance here as her attorney clearly demonstrates his
nonopposition.").
221. State ex rel. Krupa v. Green, 114 Ohio App. 497, 177 N.E.2d 616 (Ct. App. 1961); State
ex rel. Bucher v. Brower, 7 Ohio Supp. 51, 21 Ohio Op. 208 (Montgomery County C.P. 1941).
222. Weathers v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. App. 3d 286, 126 Cal. Rptr. 547 (Ct. App. 1976);
Davis v. Roos, 326 So. 2d 226 (Fla. D. Ct. App. 1976); Application of Halligan, 46 App. Div.
2d 170, 361 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1974); Dunn v. Palermo, 522 S.W.2d 679 (Tenn. 1975); Kruzel v.
Podell, 67 Wis. 2d 138, 226 N.W.2d 458 (1975).
223. Stuart v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 266 Md. 440, 442, 295 A.2d 223, 224 (1972);
In re Strikwerda, 216 Va. 470, 473, 220 S.E.2d 245, 247 (1975).
224. Cf. In re Reben, 342 A.2d 688, 702 (Me. 1975) (dissenting opinion) ("... the State
has a significant and compelling interest in requiring the maintenance of a unitary family
surname."); Kruzel v. Podell, 67 Wis. 2d 138, 159, 226 N.W.2d 458, 468 (1975) (dissenting
opinion) ("That there be such single name available to spouses, and identifying their chil-
dren, is inherent in the concept of marriage as partnership. The roles of the partners may
vary, but the identity of the partnership as a viable and functioning unit or entity is not
served by its having no name.").
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willing for the husband and wife to bear different surnames. Rather, the
sole issue is whether anyone should be given the power to veto any change
of name by his or her marital partner. The most significant case discussing
the issue, In re Taminosian,n concerned a husband who wished to adopt
a new surname reflecting his Islamic faith over the objection of his wife.
The Nebraska Supreme Court noted that the wife and children had "ac-
quired a standing in the family, in the schools, and in the community" by
their present name and that "[i]njuries to the feelings and sensibilities
of innocent women and children may result in greater suffering and dam-
age than the fraudulent invasion of property rights." '26 The majority de-
cided to deny the petition because of the wife's objection. It seems, from
the comments of the dissenting opinion"' and the majority opinion itself,
that the majority thought that the change of the husband's name resulted
in a change in the name of all family members. If the wife was required to
adopt the husband's name, her standing to object to a change of the hus-
band's surname would be considerably stronger.
The arguments against consideration of a spouse's objections to a pro-
posed change of name are strong. Where the husband and wife are not
required to have a common surname, 28 the spouse's name is unaffected by
the decision of his or her partner to change a surname. The dissent in
Taminosian pointed out that consideration of a spouse's consent reflected
a significant retreat from the common law rule that anyone may adopt a
new name through usage of the new name without a fraudulent intent.!"
In an amicus curiae brief the Attorney General of Virginia has argued that,
although notification of the spouse "may be desirable," common law prin-
ciples dictate that the spouse's consent not be required.23 Courts which
225. 97 Neb. 514, 150 N.W. 824 (1915).
226. Id. at 515, 150 N.W. at 824.
227. The change of the husband's name does not necessarily change the name of his
wife .... In the case at bar there is and can be no party named, except the petitioner
himself. No one is supposed to join issue with him.
Id. at 518, 150 N.W. at 825.
228. There are presently no state statutes requiring husband and wife to have a common
surname. Some states have, however, enacted statutes which require the consent of the
spouse before a change of name petition is granted. See note 235 infra.
229. In re Taminosian, 97 Neb. 514, 516-17, 150 N.W. 824, 825 (1915).
230. It cannot be stressed enough, however, that such a notice should not be required
in order to obtain the permission of a spouse. Absent an illegal purpose, married
individuals have the right to a change of name regardless of their spouses'
predilections.
Brief for the Attorney General of Virginia as Amicus Curiae at 7, In re Doris Ann Kaufman
Tyler (an unreported decision of the circuit court of Richmond, Va.). This brief was consid-
ered by the Virginia Supreme Court when it decided In re Strikwerda, 216 Va. 470, 220 S.E.2d
245 (1975), and is on file at the clerk's office of the Virginia Supreme Court.
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must follow the common law rule cannot consider the predilections of the
spouse because there is no indication that the common law did so.
Those courts which are not bound to the common law principles may
wish to consider the Supreme Court's discussion of consent of a husband
in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth.23 While Danforth
involved the issue of whether a state could forbid an abortion not ac-
quiesced in by the woman's husband, much of the language seems applica-
ble to the issue of spousal consent in general. After noting its appreciation
of "the importance of the marital relationship in our society, ' 2 2 the Court
stated
it is difficult to believe that the goal of fostering mutuality and trust in a
marriage, and of strengthening the marital relationship and the marriage
institution, will be achieved by giving the husband a veto power exercisable
for any reason whatsoever or for no reason at all.2
The marital unit is not a single entity with a single mind, but rather an
association of two individuals committed to one another through mar-
riage.24 Once there has arisen a conflict over the surname of the wife, it
seems, at best, doubtful that the husband has a greater interest than the
wife in which name she will bear.
Some states have enacted statutes which require the consent of the
spouse to the proposed change of name.25 Because these statutes represent
an abrogation of the common law, an argument that the common law did
not consider a spouse's consent will be fruitless. A constitutional attack
would seem to be the only possible method of challenging such consent
requirements. 6 If, however, a state legislature has not explicitly imposed
231. 96 S. Ct. 2831 (1976).
232. Id. at 2841. The Court also noted the appellee's argument that consent of both part-
ners is often required by the states in many areas of the marriage relationship. Id. at 2840-
41.
233. Id. at 2842.
234. The Court referred to its earlier comment in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453
(1972), that "the marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its
own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional
makeup." Id. at 2841 n.11.
235. IOWA CODE AN. § 674.6 (Supp. 1976); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 811 (1974).
236. Such an attack might resemble that mounted in Planned Parenthood of Central
Missouri v. Danforth, 96 S. Ct. 2831 (1976). It should be remembered, however, that the
Supreme Court before Danforth had determined that the right to an abortion was of constitu-
tional magnitude. It will be necessary to convince the court that the right to a name is also
of constitutional significance. If the statute fails to burden women more than men, an equal
protection argument is virtually precluded.
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consent as a prerequisite to a change of name, courts should be reluctant
to impose such a requirement themselves for the reasons outlined above.
3. The Problem of Children
The most frequently mentioned factor with which courts have dealt is
the effect of children upon a married woman's right to reassume use of her
pre-marriage name. Many decisions which denied the petitions of married
women concluded that use of different surnames by parents would have a
"traumatic effect" upon their children 37 and subject the children to need-
less embarrassment. As of this writing, all such recent decisions relying on
possible harm to children as a basis for denying change of name petitions
have been reversed. 2 8 Reversal, however, has been grounded upon a variety
of reasons.
Kruzel v. Podell2 9 reversed a lower court opinion without discussing the
problem of children because of the common law right to change a name
by usage if not motivated by a fraudulent purpose. Those states which
clearly have adopted the common law right without reservation are not free
to consider the question of children; if no fraudulent purpose is evident, a
change of name must be granted.
In re Strikwerda240 notes that the two childless petitioning couples had
reached an agreement that any children would bear the husbands' sur-
names. The Virginia Supreme Court apparently considers the fact of an
agreement (rather than its substance) to be significant, for it concludes
"[t]hus, there is little likelihood that a name change would have a disrup-
tive effect on the family."24 ' The fact that parents bear different surnames
does not per se have a "disruptive effect on the family." It is unclear
whether Strikwerda would have been decided differently if the couple had
not reached an agreement. If a lack of agreement is determinative, the
husband is given a subtle power to veto any proposed change of name.
Moreover, consideration for a couple's agreement may be speculative, be-
cause a husband and wife may alter their thinking considerably before
children are born.
237. Application of Lawrence, 128 N.J. Super. 312, 328, 319 A.2d 793, 801 (Bergen County
Ct. 1974), rev'd, 133 N.J. Super. 408, 337 A.2d 49 (App. Div. 1975).
238. E.g., Petition of Hauptly, 312 N.E.2d 857 (Ind. 1974), rev'g 294 N.E.2d 833 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1973); Application of Lawrence, 133 N.J. Super. 408, 337 A.2d 49 (App. Div. 1975), rev'g
128 N.J. Super. 312, 319 A.2d 793 (Bergen County Ct. 1974); In re Strikwerda, 216 Va. 470,
220 S.E.2d 245 (1975).
239. 67 Wis. 2d 138, 226 N.W.2d 458 (1975).
240. 216 Va. 470, 220 S.E.2d 245 (1975).
241. Id. at 473, 220 S.E.2d at 247.
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Several courts have indicated that mere speculation of a possible harm
to children would not justify denial of a petition to resume a pre-marriage
name. 42 The Maine Supreme Court in In re Reben 42 inferred from the
record that there were "no children with possible adverse interests" and
refused to speculate about any future children which might result from the
marriage." The Indiana Supreme Court rejected the argument that the
change of name "may cause embarrassment to her child" as "mere specu-
lation. 2 45 Thus, many courts may require those opposing the petition to
come forward with concrete evidence indicating possible harm to the chil-
dren.
The court in Application of Lawrence"6 reversed a lower court ruling
which had relied heavily upon a conclusion that a change of name might
have "a traumatic effect upon any children they may have. '247 The appeals
court concluded that the trial judge's concerns were "in conflict with the
established constitutional right of parents to raise children as they
choose.248 The extent of the constitutional right of parents to raise chil-
dren as they choose, and whether the right has any significance in the
context of the changing of a parental surname, is not settled, however.2 19
242. See Matter of Natale, 527 S.W.2d 402, 406 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (no evidence of harm
to children).
243. 342 A.2d 688, 695 (Me. 1975).
244. Cf. Application of Lawrence, 128 N.J. Super. 312, 327-28, 319 A.2d 793, 801 (Bergen
County Ct. 1974), rev'd, 133 N.J. Super. 408, 337 A.2d 49 (App. Div. 1975) ("Plaintiff and
her husband are both of youthful age. Although they have no children at this time, it is not
at all improbable that they will eventually raise a family.").
245. We cannot see how as a matter of law this can have any bearing on the case.
There is certainly no direct or positive evidence in this regard, and the mere specula-
tion by the State that such would occur is not sufficient to justify the trial court's
denial of the appellant's petition.
Petition of Hauptly, 312 N.E.2d 857, 860 (Ind. 1974), rev'g 294 N.E.2d 833 (Ind. Ct. App.
1973).
246. 133 N.J. Super. 408, 337 A.2d 49 (App. Div. 1975), rev'g 128 N.J. Super. 312, 319 A.2d
793 (Bergen County Ct. 1974).
247. 128 N.J. Super. at 328, 319 A.2d at 801.
248. 133 N.J. Super. at 414, 337 A.2d at 52. The court noted that, of course, such protected
parental control could not violate criminal laws.
249. The court cited Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), for its holding. In
Pierce, the freedom of parents to send their children to private schools was upheld. The Pierce
opinion, however, is limited to a prohibition of unreasonable governmental interference in the
education of children. The freedoms involved in the education and upbringing of children"are subject to some control by the police power." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 179, 211 (1973)
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These recent decisions thus reflect an unwillingness to ascribe harm or
embarrassment to children in the absence of concrete evidence indicating
that a change of name would result in harm. If a court considers a couple's
agreement on surnames for children, it should concern itself with the fact,
rather than the substance, of the agreement. To require that the children
bear the husband's surname would raise serious equal protection ques-
tions25 and would conflict with important common law principles. A mere
difference of surnames between a child and a parent (either father or
mother) should not per se be a basis for denying a married woman's peti-
tion to reassume her pre-marriage name.25" '
V. CONCLUSION
At common law a person was free to adopt a new name by consistent
and nonfraudulent usage of the name, even without legal proceedings. It
was never required by common law that a woman bear the surname of her
husband.
Once the veracity of these historical claims is shown, as has been done
by most recent decisions, the remaining issues are rather easily resolved.
Courts are quite reluctant to hold that adherence to English common law
should result in a greater dimunition of freedom for American women
today than English women have had for centuries. This nonbinding Eng-
lish custom was not "windblown across the Atlantic Ocean" 52 with such
impact that it should have the force of law.
Courts receiving petitions of married women wishing to reassume pre-
marriage names must determine whether the statutory method of changing
names abrogates the common law method of adoption by usage and how
much discretion a court should have in reviewing these petitions. The
answers to these questions can be derived only by examining the intent of
the legislature. If the clear intent of the legislature was to provide a recor-
dation of all changes of name, the statutory method should be viewed as
exclusive. If the intent of the legislature is not clear, courts should be
(Douglas, J., concurring). See also Runyon v. McCrary, 96 S. Ct. 2586 (1976). The govern-
ment's interference, however, must not be unreasonable.
250. See Laks v. Laks, 25 Ariz. App. 58, 540 P.2d 1277, 1280 (Ct. App. 1975).
251. Courts have been willing to allow children to bear different surnames from those with
whom they live because of a "natural right" of the "parents" [translate: father] to have
"their" children bear "their" name. Possible embarrassment to the child has not mitigated
this "natural right" and generally a child's name is not changed if the father has maintained
an active interest in the child. See Carlsson, Surnames of Married Women and Legitimate
Children, 17 N.Y.L.F. 552 (1971).
252. Cf. Dunn v. Palermo, 522 S.W.2d 679, 687 (Tenn. 1975), discussed in notes 96-104
supra and accompanying text.
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reluctant to determine that the common law right of adoption by usage is
not a coexisting method of changing a name. The amount of discretion a
judge should exercise is dependent upon whether the legislature wished to
restrict the number of changes of names. If the common law is followed, a
judge should have little discretion at all.
The determinative issue in the battle over a married woman's name is
whether a state has so significant an interest in a particular name-symbol
of marriage that a woman should bear a name which she does not desire.
There is no common law requirement that husband and wife bear the
husband's (or even a common) surname. No state statute requires such.213
Courts, therefore, should be reluctant to impose a requirement which legis-
latures have not chosen to impose. Although a state may have significant
interests in marriage, couples ought to be free to choose name-symbols
which reflect their understanding of the marital relationship and their
commitment to one another.
William C. Matthews, Jr.
253. The one remaining state which had such a requirement has amended its statute so
that a person may choose which name he or she will adopt after marriage. Compare HAWAI
REV. STAT. § 574-1 (1968) ("Every married woman shall adopt her husband's name as a family
name.") with § 574-1 (Supp. 1975) ("Upon marriage each of the parties shall declare the
surname each will use as a married person.").
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